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ABSTRACT 
 
This study explored the functions of dialogue in emerging adults’ moral turning 
points. Through purposive sampling, the researcher interviewed 10 emerging 
adults between 25 and 30 years old about experiences of turning point 
conversations during the years of 18 and 25. This study employed constant 
comparative and grounded theory methodologies to analyze messages reported in 
memorable conversations during this period. Results indicated that dialogue 
functioned to educate, disturb, and maintain emerging adults’ moral perception 
during this period of moral reorientation. Subcategories under each included 
dialogue that functioned to explain, invite, warn, direct or instruct, challenge, 
persuade, agitate, expose, inquire, legitimize, co-reflect, redefine, and affirm or 
reinforce. This report cites passages from interview data to highlight how dialogic 
themes informed or shaped changes in moral perception. In each participant’s 
self-reported turning point conversations there was an admixture of dialogic 
functions at work. Notably, participants’ experience of moral turning (degree and 
trajectory) varied despite there being similarity in intended functions of dialogue.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Interest in moral stages has declined in recent years, as the view on 
morality as a whole has broadened. The entire context of moral judgment 
and action are now being examined, including moral sensitivity, 
motivation, and commitment. (Minnameier, 2009, p. 131) 
  In this passage, Gerhard Minnameier, a professor of vocational and 
business education and philosophy in Germany, summarizes the state of affairs in 
research surrounding moral development. Globalization and the ensuing exposure 
to myriad worldviews has created a complex communication climate in which 
persons struggle to find mechanisms by which we may foster understanding 
among differing conceptions of morality. Also expressed in Minnameier’s words 
is the desire to seek out such processes, creating space for moral ideas or 
practices, and the basic beliefs therein, to be illuminated. The following study 
finds this landscape as the backdrop for an exploration of moral turning points in 
emerging adulthood. Guiding this exploration, turning point theory provides a 
unique opportunity to make sense of the ways in which communication functions 
to shape persons’ actions (Arnett, 1997; Baxter, Braithwaite, & Nicholson, 1999; 
Baxter & Braithwaite, 2008). On this account, it is believed that turning points—
periods of significant change or transition—are likely to expose critical 
communicative processes at work in daily interaction. Not only are turning points 
important experiences to examine in terms of how communicators experience 
change, but literature suggests that this characteristic is implicit in the very nature 
of turning points: “turning point events are perceived to lead to relational change 
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and to other types of change” (Docan-Morgan & Manusov, 2009, p. 182, italics 
added). Building on past turning point scholarship, this study expands theorizing 
of turning points with the context of negotiating morality. Morality, though 
defined by sundry scholars in differing manners, can broadly be described as the 
area of study that addresses questions regarding “right” or “wrong” actions and 
beliefs.  
As the subsequent review of literature will outline, how persons define 
“right” or “wrong” actions and beliefs is the question that makes the negotiation 
of morality a communicative phenomena. Studying morality in the context of 
emerging adulthood is vital because this stage in life is filled with much transition 
and choice. Thus, turning points at this age can have a lasting impact on persons’ 
moral development (Arnett, 1997; Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001). This 
exploration of moral turning points can foster greater understanding of the process 
by which emerging adults come to answer the question, “what ought I do?” More 
specifically, this is an exploration of how communication functions to influence, 
direct, or shape transitions in moral understanding through emerging adults’ 
participation in dialogue. Consequently, the subjects or moral domains of 
dialogue, which are salient in the realm of emerging adulthood, are not the current 
focus. Instead, this study clarifies the manner in which communication either 
supports, challenges, clarifies, questions, or encourages changes in the valuation 
of moralities adopted by emerging adults during these formative years. 
  This project is divided into four sections. The first section (Chapter 2) will 
outline relevant philosophical work to the topic of morality and dialogue: it will 
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be argued that the relevancy of such work is perceived in their conceptualization 
of human-being as inseparable from language and dialogue. The second section 
(Chapter 3), with this philosophical foundation presupposed, will more 
specifically focus on the social scientific scholarship conducted in recent years 
regarding the concept of moral reasoning and moral negotiation. Also, this section 
will be devoted to providing relevant insights on the nature of turning points and 
providing literature that argues for the relevancy of emerging adulthood as a rich 
context in which to study communication phenomena. Following the review of 
literature, section three (Chapter 4) will be dedicated to considering the 
methodological approach taken in this project. Examples of studies employing 
these qualitative methods in recent communication scholarship will serve as 
support for taking such an approach in analyzing the phenomenon at hand. 
Finally, in the fourth section (Chapter 5), results will be provided, analyzed, and 
discussed.  
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Chapter Two: Philosophical Perspectives on Morality 
  History reveals the cumulative insight and outworking of ideas that 
constitute societies’ and persons’ expressions of shared belief and shared ways of 
living. More specifically, this relationship of ideas finds expression in a socio-
historical, circumstantial manner, affecting the way people live together in 
community. Foundational to these circumstances is the idea that persons: 
Live in a community by virtue of the things, which they have in common; 
and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in 
common. What they must have in common in order to form a community 
or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge— a common 
understanding— like-mindedness as the sociologists say.  
(Dewey, 1944, p. 4) 
 
We find ourselves, then, with the responsibility of growing in our understanding 
of the differing conceptions of morality and the ways in which these differing 
conceptions inform and confront each other in our present society. In the above 
passage, Dewey understands that communication is always-already showing the 
possibilities for human relating. This mode of being through, in, and by 
communication is active in giving meaning to our shared experience. The task is 
to discover what meaning is given and how it is constructed. In the conception of 
morality with which this study is concerned, these discourses are at the forefront 
of our present societal concerns: explicitly present in dialogue, or implicitly 
present in disposition and action.  
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Creating a Taxonomy for Understanding Ethical Communication 
 In their recent edited volume, Ethical Communication: Moral Stances in 
Human Dialogue, Christians and Merrill (2009) attempt to construct a taxonomy 
that describes the various understandings of morality as they relate to the subject 
of communication (see Table 1). Christians and Merrill organize these different 
conceptions of morality from various traditions. For example, when speaking 
about morality, some choose to emphasize the importance of acting in a way that 
focuses on the welfare of others. In this context a moral belief or action would be 
one predicated on caring for others, whether it be the greatest number as with the 
utilitarianism of John Stewart Mill, or caring for one’s neighbor as in the 
teachings of Jesus. Other theorists, according to Christians and Merrill, situate 
morality in the realm of actions that reflect a loyalty to one’s self. In this 
framework, as seen in Aristotle’s writings, we have a moral obligation to develop 
ourselves as individuals. Similarly, Ayn Rand concludes that citizens cannot act 
ethically in a society if there is not present a self-interest or reverence for one’s 
own possibilities. Much more could be said about the uniqueness and complexity 
of these moral frameworks that cannot be said here. Instead, for this present 
project it is interesting to note how Christians and Merrill make an attempt to 
answer the question: How do philosophers, religious thinkers, and other 
intellectuals compare in terms of their explications about what it means to be 
ethical? The more important question would be: How are these understandings of 
morality expounded upon if not through, by, and about communicative practice? 
In fact, in the following sections, the case will be made that morality does not 
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happen outside of communication but, instead, moral understanding is made 
possible by communication (i.e. in language).  
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Table 1 
 
Ethical Stances Described in Terms of Loyalty 
 
Ethical Stance Defining Characteristic Exemplars 
Loyalty to Others Ethical action benefits 
others rather than 
focusing on the self or 
general virtues or 
following the law. 
- Dalai Lama 
- Jesus 
- Mother Teresa 
- Martin Luther King, Jr. 
- Carol Gilligan 
Loyalty to Self Ethical concern is 
primarily for the self. 
This may not exclude a 
social sense, but the 
development of the 
virtuous self.  
- Machiavelli 
- Nietzsche 
- Aristotle 
- Ayn Rand 
- Kautilya of India 
Loyalty to Freedom These ethicists are lovers 
of freedom and especially 
resist rule-bound ethics 
of historical figures in the 
legalist ethical stance.  
- John Locke 
- Henry David Thoreau 
- Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
- Paulo Freire 
- Hannah Arendt 
Loyalty to Authority This approach 
emphasizes following 
rules. This stance is 
normative and honors an 
authority or a revered 
code of principles.  
- Moses 
- Muhammed  
- Plato 
- Kant 
- Hobbes 
 
Loyalty to Community This stance is known as 
social ethics. 
Communitarian ethics 
places emphasis on the 
idea of democracy. 
- Confucius  
- Dewey 
- Marx 
- Gandhi 
- Levinas 
 
 
Note. Adapted from Ethical Communication: Moral Stances in Human Dialogue 
by Christian and Merril, 2009.   
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The thinkers mentioned previously are outlined and grouped together by 
Christians and Merrill (2009) because they share certain characteristic 
perspectives about morality. First, they group together thinkers such as Henry 
David Thoreau, John Locke, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Paulo Freire, and Hannah 
Arendt, all of which share a belief that freedom is a pivotal ingredient in morality. 
For Christians and Merrill’s second group, juxtaposed with this loyalty to the 
freedom or rights of the individual, common notions regarding morality hinge on 
people’s disposition toward authority: a functional outworking of this conception 
is seen in a deontological, duty-driven ethic. The final category proposed by 
Christians and Merrill (2009), as exemplified by Emmanuel Levinas, Confucius, 
and others, reflects the goal of community-driven ethics. This perspective situates 
ethics and morality as a means by which a healthy, thriving community life is 
realized. In this way, the broader group (community) is held as the marker for 
moral belief or action. As a result, if any action is aimed at supporting the welfare 
of the community by deconstructing alienating power structures or supporting 
democratic dialogue or consensus, it is deemed ethical. Christians and Merrill 
connect the moral explications of historical thinkers and, in so doing, 
communicate the influence of such perspectives on what we understand to be 
ethical communication. By classifying different moral frameworks in terms of 
human being-together (in some thinkers, this was not the focus of human-being), 
Christians and Merrill bring out each philosopher’s way of talking about what is 
most basic or central to dwelling ethically in the world. Authors focusing on 
loyalty to authority as the rubric for understanding morality may perceive humans 
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essentially as beings that need and desire structure. In other words, following a 
code of conduct given by some religious authority constitutes a meaningful 
human experience. For the following thinkers, defining what it means to be an 
ethical human being has the task of first defining what it most fundamentally 
means to partake in human-being. In the following section, beginning with Leo 
Tolstoy, passages from their work will be explicated to bring out this emphasis on 
what it means to be human. First in Tolstoy, we will see that, from one vantage 
point, we cannot think about morality without coming to terms with his 
conception of religion. Secondly, Immanuel Kant takes this further. A particular 
reading of Kant would contend that religion has made its mark on people’s 
conceptions of morality, but an enlightened individual is one who is engaged in 
public discourse and free debate. Thirdly Plato’s Socrates, in the form of a 
question, takes up this public converging of ideas on morality: How is one to 
understand wisdom or to know if one is wise? And finally in Heidegger we 
perceive the conditions for the possibility of our engaging in dialogue. We come 
to see that we are always-already together meaningfully in the world through 
language and our continued communication about what we ought to do 
characterizes the negotiated nature of moral understanding. That is to say, our 
moral conceptions are not mere abstractions; they are shared ways of interpreting 
that world and how we ought to act in it.  
Dialogic Conceptions of Man 
 Leo Tolstoy. Arguably one of the most influential Russian novelists of the 
19th century, Leo Tolstoy published many works of literature that took up the 
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most profound questions surrounding what it means to be human, for better and 
for worse. However, it was much later in his life that Tolstoy wrote a series of 
essays relating his deeply held convictions about religion and morality. In one 
particular essay, he sorts out two questions posed to him: “(1) What does [he] 
understand by the word ‘religion,’ and (2) Does [he] consider it possible for 
morality to exist independently of religion, as [he] understands it” (1987, p. 131)? 
In answering these two questions, Tolstoy inexorably links his definition of 
religion and his conception of a moral human being. Denying that the “essence of 
religion lies in the fear evoked before the unknown forces of nature, and in the 
recognition and worship of imaginary beings” (p. 133), he instead believes that 
religion is “the relationship man establishes between himself and the infinite, 
never-ending universe, or its origin and first cause” (p. 142). By implication, 
religion is a continuous process whereby humans orient their beliefs and actions 
based on how they understand their relation to the external world. Morality, then, 
is understood as the “indication and explanation of those activities which 
automatically result when a person maintains one or other relationship to the 
universe” (p. 142).  
 Following this insight as to the connection between religion and morality, 
one can discern how different interpretations lead to different actions. For 
example, one who perceives his relationship to the universe to be the realization 
of his personal well-being may be hard-pressed to understand morality in terms of 
caring for others. Such a person’s goals of success will invariably overshadow the 
concerns of the group.  
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The next orientation about which Tolstoy speaks, “where the purpose of 
life is held to lie in the well-being of a particular group of individuals, gives rise 
to a moral doctrine that requires a person to serve that group whose well-being is 
recognized as the purpose of life” (p. 142). Here, Tolstoy points to the doctrine of 
self-renunciation whereby persons are able to sacrifice some part of their personal 
success or well-being in order to serve the greater purpose of the group.  
 Further, Tolstoy recognizes another level of moral, religious insight. In the 
following passage, he outlines the circumstances that give rise to this third 
conception of man’s relation to the universe. He writes: 
 None of the philosophical arguments stemming from a religious view of  
life that is pagan can prove to a person that it is more advantageous and 
reasonable not to live for his own well-being, which he desires, 
understands, finds possible, or for the well-being of his family, or society, 
but for the well-being that is unknown, undesired, incomprehensible and 
unattainable by human means. A philosophy founded on an understanding 
of human life and confined to the welfare of man will never be in a 
position to prove to a rational person, who knows that he might die at any 
moment, that it is good for him and that he must deny himself his own 
desired, appreciated, and undoubted well-being, and do so not for the good 
of others (because he will never know the results of his sacrifices) but 
simply because it is necessary and worthy, and a categorical imperative. 
(p. 146) 
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Appealing to greater level of rhetorical persuasion, Tolstoy sets this conception of 
morality over the others. In the third orientation of man’s relation to the universe, 
persons are cognizant of the providence and will of a transcendent being: a first 
cause or originator desiring a particular end for humans. In this framework, 
motivation for moral action is not found in the realization of personal well-being 
or the perceived well-being of a group. Instead, energy is spent discerning the will 
of this “higher” being. In the end, Tolstoy claims that “there can be no genuine, 
non-hypocritical morality that is without a religious foundation, just as there can 
be no plant without roots” (p. 150).  
 In this moral schema, in order to ask what one ought to do, persons would 
be urged to look at their relation to the origin of the universe— not as a fearful 
response to unknown forces, but instead as a response to the search for that which 
brings purpose to the lives of humans. By way of these explanations of man’s 
relation to the universe, Tolstoy exemplifies the necessity of giving an account of 
what it means to be human in the discussion of what it means to be a moral 
individual or society. His insights echo the keen judgment by Dewey about the 
elemental necessity of communication in understanding human relationships.  
 Along with the connecting theme of what it means to be human, all of the 
categories set forth by Christians and Merrill (2009) pertained to a particular 
expression of morality: the quality of being loyal to some idea, person, or group 
of persons. For the following thinkers, and the guiding theoretical thread of this 
thesis, loyalty to dialogue or conversation is central to what it means to be a moral 
individual. Furthermore, dialogue is vital because if one (with concepts 
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understood through language) who lives with others in the world (a world of 
language) wants to find out how they “ought to” live and best relate with one 
another, this ultimately needs to be done through dialogue. In this conception of 
morality, countless philosophers are implicated. However, in the following 
section, only a handful will be enumerated in order to show how philosophers 
whose ideas are not compatible in many ways actually find harmony because they 
all find language and the exchange of ideas through dialogue to be crucial to a 
rich understanding of morality. 
 Immanuel Kant. Impassioned by the possibility that change in the way 
human-being was conceptualized would “bring about a falling off of personal 
despotism and of avaricious or tyrannical oppression,” Kant (1798) was invested 
in describing the conditions by which he thought change might become a reality 
in his An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment (p. 2)? This 
transformation in the way persons relate to each other would not be through 
revolution because revolution was sure to replace one tyrant with yet another and 
another. Instead, Kant promulgates that, “for this enlightenment, however, 
nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the least harmful of anything that 
could even be called freedom: namely, freedom to make public use of one’s 
reason in all matters” (1798, p. 2). In order for humans to be enlightened, they 
need not be merely told what is right and what is wrong: their actions directed 
solely by an authority figure. Instead, persons need to have the opportunity to 
partake in the education, or sharpening, of their intellect. This sharpening would 
make a more sophisticated public dialogue about morality possible without the 
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necessity of control. Wisdom would direct change in a society, not the will of a 
select, powerful few. In postulating this kind of free discourse, Kant (1798) 
anticipates feelings of trepidation on the part of those in power, disallowing them 
from understanding the gravity and benefit of the change that enlightenment 
would bring. In the following passage, Kant addresses these potential fears: 
But I hear from all sides the cry: do not argue! The officer says: Do not 
argue but drill! The tax official: Do not argue but pay! The clergyman: Do 
not argue but believe! (Only one ruler in the world says: Argue as much as 
you will and about whatever you will, but obey!) Everywhere there are 
restrictions on freedom. But what sort of restriction hinders enlightenment, 
and what sort does not hinder but instead promotes it? I reply: The public 
use of one’s reason must always by free, and it alone can bring about 
enlightenment among human beings. (p. 2, italics in original) 
This revolutionary claim says that the enlightenment and, in turn, the 
advancement or progress of society would only be realized if citizens were able to 
freely disseminate their ideas about any number of life’s issues whether they be 
political, religious, etc. Dialogue and argumentation are, here, set apart as 
indispensable to what it means to be human. For Kant, it is not the case that 
enlightenment should bring an end to authority and duty. Instead, persons are 
given a particular forum—public sphere—in which to voice their individual 
understanding, rightly called the public use of one’s reason. In the private use of 
one’s reason, persons are called to uphold the duty of their position. Systemically, 
giving persons the freedom to exchange ideas about an array of subjects, 
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including morality, cultivates an environment in which human dignity is upheld. 
As a result, humans “who are now more than machines” rise above their “self-
incurred minority” and are able to construct a more complex, well-rounded moral 
understanding (p. 6). 
 Socrates. In Plato’s “Apology,” Socrates exemplifies a philosopher, a 
lover of wisdom, who is dedicated to the search for deeper understanding. 
Possessing understanding takes considerable humility as many are willing to 
contradict the wisdom of a person who presumes to possess it. Only through a 
process of much discussion or deliberation will they come to find out with which 
wisdom resides. Socrates understands the definitive quality of meaningful 
dialogue to be this kind of examination. We see upon a closer reading of Socrates' 
apology that this examination is realized through extensive dialogue with others. 
In fact, in order to test the validity of what the Oracle says about him, Plato says 
of Socrates:  
I thought of a way to try to find out, something like this: I approached one 
of those who had the reputation of being wise, for there, I thought, if 
anywhere, I should test the revelation and prove that the oracle was 
wrong: “Here is one wiser than I, but you said I was wiser.” (1984, p. 507) 
Socrates does not merely accept the words of the Oracle. Rather, he tests this 
revelation through dialogue with others that may prove to be wiser than he. What 
Socrates finds astonishes even him. Through questioning a politician, a poet, and 
an artisan, Socrates finds that he is truly wiser than his fellow man by virtue of 
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one trait: Socrates, unlike the others, understands that he does not know all there 
is to know.  
 In the end, Socrates is put on trial for the very characteristic that sets him 
above the rest of his citizenry— the desire to gain wisdom even if it means 
questioning his own assumptions or pride. Meletos, one of those who sought 
Socrates' demise, accuses Socrates of aspiring to corrupt the youth of Athens. In 
his integrity, Socrates denounces this through the very same process of dialogue. 
He questions the reasoning behind Meletos’ accusation. Socrates points out that 
most men, if not all, aim to influence their associates toward the good precisely 
because those same associates whom one influences will be the persons with 
whom one shares his life. He asks Meletos, “Have I indeed come to such a depth 
of ignorance that I do not know even this—that if I make one of my associates 
bad I shall risk getting some evil from him—to such a depth as to do so great an 
evil intentionally, as you say” (p. 512)? In these words, Socrates supports the idea 
that, if we do evil to those around us, it is at minimum unintentional. Conversely, 
we seek to do good by those around us and, for Socrates, doing good by those 
around him is engaging in meaningful dialogue or argumentation that sharpens 
and brings wisdom. A final instance in which Socrates defends his dialogic aim 
and foundation is seen when he is asked to lead a quiet life and not bother their 
political process with his questioning. He responds with the following:  
 For if I say that this is to disobey the god, and therefore I cannot keep  
quiet, you will not believe me but think I am a humbug. If again I say  
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it is the greatest good for a man every day to discuss virtue and the other 
things, about which you hear  me talking and examining myself and 
everybody else, and that life without enquiry is not worth living for a man, 
you will believe me still less if I say that. (p. 526) 
Throughout his life and trial, Socrates embodied his undying commitment to the 
process of examining his life through conversation with others. As a result, he 
braved the grave consequences of the death penalty in order to be an example to a 
society which did not value the same. Though he was executed, Socrates' manner 
of living persisted, guiding others in a method of self-examination through 
inviting intellectual debate and dialogue. 
 Martin Heidegger. Desiring to give a phenomenological account of being 
(i.e. how being shows itself in its everyday dealings with and in the world), 
Heidegger (1966) explicates the nature of thinking and the conditions for the 
possibility of living together in the world. Accordingly, Heidegger spoke, and, we 
can say, still speaks to a public that is far too thoughtless. Heidegger 
conceptualizes the issue in the following way: “Thoughtlessness is an uncanny 
visitor who comes and goes everywhere in today’s world. For nowadays we take 
in everything in the quickest and cheapest way, only to forget it just as quickly, 
instantly” (1966, p. 45). Although persons may be engaged in many activities, all 
of which include the presence and participation of others, it is important to 
understand the quality or essence of such participation in more detail. In this 
regard, Heidegger points out that “man today is in a flight from thinking...but part 
of this flight is that man will neither see nor admit it” (p. 45, italics in original). 
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The reason that man neither sees nor admits his flight from thinking is because his 
understanding of thinking has evolved altogether; failing to recognize that 
thinking is inextricably connected to, even rooted in, communicating and always-
already being understandingly or meaningfully in the world.  
 Accordingly, Heidegger situates thinking as the “place” where the world 
can show itself as meaningful through communication (i.e. humans interacting 
with other humans and entities in the world). In order to garner a deeper 
understanding of how humans relate in and by communication, Heidegger 
purports that “we speak because speaking is natural to us... language belongs to 
the closest neighborhood of man’s being” (1971, p. 187). Dialogue is a central 
part of our humanity because we are always-already interpreting our experience, 
using language and reason to do so. This is not to say that we do not have 
automatic, emotional, or intuitive responses to sensuous experience. However, we 
make such experience meaningful by communicating our understanding of our 
experience through language. In this concept of being, Dasein (i.e. human-being) 
is differentiated from entities that are present-at-hand. Entities that are present-at-
hand are beings for which their being is not an issue (e.g. a car, a hammer, a 
computer). He explains this distinction by arguing that: 
That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each 
case mine. Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or 
special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. 
To entities such as these, their Being is ‘a matter of indifference’, or more 
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precisely, they ‘are’ such that their Being can be neither a matter of 
indifference to them, nor the opposite. (1962, p. 68) 
In other words, human-being cannot be conceptualized as the adding together of 
entities in the world. We are not merely defined by the number of bones in our 
bodies, the kinds of cells in our blood, or even the unique pattern of our particular 
DNA strand. What makes Dasein, Dasein is that it is the “site” in, or towards, 
which the world discloses itself. This means that the activities about which Dasein 
is concerned are communicative activities that interpret, create, or respond to the 
world. Entities present-at-hand in the world do not have this concern and they 
show this by way of an absence of understanding or an indifference of sorts.  
Entities in the world, present-at-hand, always-already show themselves as 
ready-to-hand. To put it differently, the disclosure of entities’ meaningfulness to 
Dasein is ineluctably defined in terms of their “toward which” or “for that which” 
character: entities are interpreted as being for our human endeavors that are 
always-already “underway.” Consequently, Dasein is always-already 
understandingly responding to entities in the world by way of responding to or 
interpreting their “involvement” in the world. For example, the computer on 
which one writes one’s thesis is not just an aluminum and plastic piece of 
technology. It is the tool by which one continues in his or her studies and continue 
going on his or her path. The computer is ready-to-hand, meaningful, in a totality 
of significance (i.e. the conditions for the possibility of its showing itself in a 
particular manner). When Heidegger explicates this concept of “totality of 
significance” he writes:  
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Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the 
possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with 
involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and which can 
thus make themselves known as they are in themselves. (1962, p. 120) 
In other words, Dasein needs to be understood as distinct from entities in the 
world because it is to Dasein that the things in the world show themselves; Dasein 
makes the showing possible. For the scope this study, this is an import foundation 
from which to start because dialogue can be conceptualized as participation in the 
activities of Dasein (i.e. responding to the world as disclosed through language). 
With this in mind, dialogue can be seen as something “ready-to-hand” though, not 
quite. Entities are ready-to-hand and dialogue is not an entity as such. Therefore, 
dialogue can be “caught up” in the totality of a project and when one is 
circumspect one can see the significance of dialogue’s function in a sense. 
However, this can only be analogous to Heidegger’s conception of the ready-to-
hand because language is discovered, “used”, in the way a pen (object present-at-
hand) could never be.  
 Interestingly though, persons’ moral understandings can “break down” 
almost as things that are ready-to-hand can. In this way, Heidegger’s discussion of 
the (un)readiness-to-hand becomes especially helpful in starting to theorize the 
nature of moral turning points. He describes that “when an assignment has been 
disturbed—when something is unusable for some purpose— then the assignment 
becomes explicit” (p. 105, italics in original). If moral frameworks are our 
habitual responses, or understandings, of the world and these systems fail to 
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continue giving an adequate picture of what our experiences “uncover,” then we 
can be motivated to comport ourselves toward entities or toward other humans 
differently. Heidegger’s intellectual work on the nature of human-being (Dasein) 
informs the current project by way of the importance of interpretation and the 
communication of interpretation through dialogue as necessary conditions for the 
possibility of understanding morality.  
Philosophy as a Foundation for Understanding Communication Ethics 
 Following the insight of these thinkers, we perceive a fundamental quality 
of human experience: we have basic beliefs about the nature of what it means to 
be human and our values are informed by these basic beliefs. In turn, our differing 
values guide the ways in which we understand what constitutes a meaningful, 
shared social world. These interpretations mark the driving force of influence in 
how morality is defined in this study: morality is an ongoing communicative 
negotiation of basic beliefs and values. One thing that is clear, implicitly or 
explicitly, is that moral turning will not be done apart from communication and 
dialogue. Being familiar with the ideas of these scholars, any theory of moral 
turning needs to be grounded in communication because it is the site where 
morality is expressly negotiated.  If persons are going to experience a change in 
their moral framework, it will not likely happen apart from the influence of 
others. Furthermore, it is to be expected that when persons’ “ready-to-hand” 
moral framework is disturbed, the only way persons will be able to “re-settle” 
their understanding will be through learning how others make sense of their 
world. Although this influence could come through nonverbal means (i.e. 
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watching a particular representation of morality on a T.V. show), Tolstoy, 
Socrates, Kant, and Heidegger suggest that the participation in language is 
requisite for morality.  
It is also important to understand the “type” of person who is suggested to 
be a common influencer. For Socrates, a mentor or public educator was influential 
in educating or corrupting (in his accusers’ language) the youth of Athens. New 
moral conceptions came through an older person whose insights presented 
information about differing worldviews. This is not to exclude other influences 
such as parents, girlfriends, boyfriends, siblings, and others who are likely to 
influence the ways in which these emerging adults form their worldview. With 
Kant’s idea of the “cosmopolitan” it can be argued that this process of exposure, 
and the change that often follows, grows as the ability for the free exchange of 
ideas in public discourse grows. It would also be somewhat surprising, if Tolstoy 
is accurate in his estimation, to find religion absent in informing public and 
private discourse concerning morality. Instead, it will be expected that 
participants find some vocabulary for speaking about morality in any admixture 
of world religions. These examples elucidate the philosophical foundation upon 
which this study can start to contextualize moral turning points in emerging 
adulthood.  
 Douglas Birkhead (1989) conducting research for the journal, Critical 
Studies in Mass Communication, wrote the following passage that provides an 
important insight necessary for studying morality and communication: 
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Moral reasoning as deliberative action to be consummated in behavior is 
preceded by contemplation, the cultivation of a way of seeing the world 
that is not concerned with specific acts. Morality is thus more than a mode 
of behavior. It is a form of reality construction, a technique for observing 
and expressing interpretations about aspects of the world which are 
humanly unobservable and ineffable without an ethical sensitivity.  
(p. 289) 
In other words, morality is a communicative creation of a particular kind of 
worldview enactment. Cultivation, contemplation, observing, and expressing are 
social behaviors: communication is done in community as Dewey helps us see. 
Taking this into account, along with the insights of the previously outlined 
philosophies, it can be hypothesized that moral turning points are a process by 
which persons cultivate a new way of the seeing the world based on exposure to 
new techniques of observing or interpreting the world. Moreover, morality is not 
merely contemplation about right and wrong; behavior or action follows. The 
following section will outline the research that addresses morality, turning points, 
and emerging adulthood in various contexts. Scholars provide various ways by 
which we can understand these three topics and their importance in constructing a 
complex framework for human communication. By outlining recent research 
projects, a case will built for connecting them in the study of moral turning points 
in emerging adulthood. 
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Chapter Three: Review of Social Science Literature 
Morality and Communication 
 Moral development. As was outlined in the previous section, many 
scholars throughout history have tried to give an exposition of the means by 
which persons form moral concepts. These concepts, in turn, produce a 
framework for how one “ought to” live in society. In the midst of this diversity, 
many scholars in the social scientific traditions have adopted the view that 
morality arises in a socially constructed fashion. In taking up the work on moral 
stages theory originating in the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, Minnameier (2009) 
communicates what he, along with most scholars at present, believes to be the 
pivotal quality that spawns moral negotiation among human beings:  
The recognition that there are no such absolute—or divine—moral 
standards (in the sense of concrete laws such as, i.e., the Ten 
Commandments), but that morality consists in the rules for social conduct 
that human beings create by themselves as a consequence of and as a 
regulation for public life in a society. (p. 134)  
To put it another way, it is not quite accurate to say that morality consists of the 
content of set standards (i.e. Ten Commandments) but that morality is 
exemplified in the process of dialogue focused on understanding such “content.” 
In this light, research has overwhelmingly focused on creating a descriptive 
taxonomy of how persons enact their moral understandings in different traditions 
and cultures, in one’s own mind, and among persons involved in interpersonal 
relationships. Although the mental processes involved in moral reasoning are not 
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the focus of this research, it is important to provide a brief review of Kohlberg’s 
work on moral development because he plays an influential role in the 
methodology that researchers employ to study morality. 
 Kohlberg situates moral reasoning as a phenomenon that is not merely 
culturally relative, but a process of transitioning through sequential stages 
(Kurtines & Greif, 1974).  Kohlberg further differentiates the developmental 
stages of Piaget and describes three levels and six stages of moral development, 
rather than two general stages. After conducting a study in which he presents 
participants with a variety of moral dilemmas (72 middle and lower-class boys), 
he outlined six developmental types of value orientations that were salient in his 
interpretation of their responses to these moral dilemmas. The first level in 
Kohlberg’s theory, the Premoral Level, includes Stage 1 and Stage 2, punishment 
and obedience orientation and naïve instrumental hedonism, respectively. The 
second level of moral development is the Morality of Conventional Role 
Conformity, which includes Stage 3, the good-boy morality of maintaining good 
relations or approval of others, and Stage 4, authority-maintaining morality. The 
final level, Morality of Self –Accepted Moral Principles, includes Stage 5, 
morality of contract and democratically accepted law, and Stage 6, morality of 
individual principles of conscience (Kohlberg, 1963a). Many scholars have 
postulated that this last stage is reached during the beginning stages of emerging 
adulthood. However, Kohlberg has stated that moral maturity that is defined by 
the capacity for principled reasoning is actually embodied by very few people (as 
cited in Kurtines & Greif, 1974).   
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 Distinct from the previous developmental framework, Marsha Aileen 
Hewitt (2008), drawing on the work of Sigmund Freud, describes the religious (or 
“moral”) impulse to be just that, an impulse or a drive that has been impressed 
upon humans by way of a historical truth communicated in and through one’s 
subconscious. For Hewitt, this impulse is rightly understood as a historical truth, 
grounded in past human experiences (memories) that shape persons’ culturally-
situated moral responses. The following passage elucidates this conception in 
greater detail:  
If we reformulate and reconceptualize these memory traces and 
impressions that are embedded in the deepest recesses of the mind in terms 
of attachment theory, then the experience being described may well refer 
to that profound yearning and wishing for the love and protection of a 
strong caretaker that is encoded in the human being’s drive for survival, 
which is a feature of evolutionary development. (p. 67)  
So, one can derive from this example that moral thinking in some cases has been 
studied and understood as an “encoded” drive, purported to be a subconscious 
inheritance necessary for survival. This explanation coincides with the sentiments 
of other social scientific research. Though, there is invariably a cognitive 
component to morality, humans find emotion or intuition as the originating, 
emergent impulse of this process. As a reiteration, Hewitt (2008) enumerates the 
following: “This does not mean that infants experience this longing (for a 
supernatural protective deity) consciously but rather that it is an unformulated, 
deeply felt and inherent need for attachment” (p. 67). In fact, this longing is 
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similar in many ways to our moral impulses, communicated and “felt” in and by 
an inherent need; apparently conceived as the need to understand our survival in 
terms of participation in a moral society. In Hewitt’s explication of moral 
impulses, moral reflexivity can only be explained as a result of secure attachment 
in early childhood development. Reflexive “individuals [are those] whose 
emotional organization, self or “other” representations and capacity for embracing 
and holding a multiplicity of perspectives are rooted in infantile experiences of 
secure attachment” (Hewitt, 2008, p. 74). This alternate view of moral 
development, juxtaposed against Kohlberg’s more cognitive taxonomy, 
emphasizes the nature of early childhood attachment as having the greatest 
formative effect on the way individuals form moral understandings.  
 Differing from these psychological approaches found in the work of 
Hewitt, Kohlberg and Minnameier, explicated in terms of stage development 
(Minnameier critiques and adapts Kohlberg’s moral stages), this study aims to 
understand the ways in which communication expresses, supports, or challenges 
individuals’ moral notions. Presently, however, more has to be explicated about 
how social scientists have studied and, consequently, described the fundamental 
characteristics of communication about moral issues. 
 Intuitive or automatic moral response vs. principled reasoning. Not 
surprisingly, there are longstanding disagreements about the nature of negotiating 
morality. With the concept of negotiation comes the idea that “morality is 
concerned not just with the quality of a decision when the need arises but with 
states of attention, perception, and consciousness” (Birkhead, 1989, p. 289). 
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Discussions and applied studies such as the work done by Murphy, Wilde, Ogden, 
Barnard, and Calder (2009) distinguish between intuitive, emotional responses to 
morality as opposed to a process of “principled reasoning”: an automatic process 
juxtaposed with one that takes more cognitive effort (p. 41). In this study, Murphy 
et al. adapted a methodology used in previous sociological and psychological 
studies that aimed to measure the extent to which readers create rich mental 
representations of characters’ emotions in stories. For example, in accordance 
with findings from pilot tests about what was considered “moral” and “immoral,” 
they created 24 stories (12 stories with a “moral” ending and 12 stories with an 
“immoral” ending). Each of the stories was followed by a target sentence, which 
asked the participant to agree or disagree. Participants were randomly assigned to 
a pair of stories with the same target sentence. This was named a moral-immoral 
pair. A target sentence that summarized a given story and its moral theme 
appeared in this manner: “Jessica (or Valerie) thought about the situation and 
decided it would be wrong for her to do it” (Murphy et al., 2009, p. 44). By using 
this methodology, Murphy et al. maintain that they measured the level of 
cognition used in moral reasoning and found out something interesting about the 
automaticity of moral judgments. Their findings suggest that persons may have 
running inner commentaries that express moral perceptions. These perceptions 
indicate beliefs or behaviors as right or wrong and this expression can be 
measured in terms of reading time (the time it takes to process a “moral” 
statement or story). What is still unclear is exactly how persons come to 
understand particular beliefs or behaviors as moral and others as immoral, for, “it 
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is often the case that an individual who practices dubious morals may still possess 
adequate knowledge of what others consider to be right or wrong” (p. 48).   
 An interesting question arises as a result of this discussion: what is the 
connection between what one knows others to perceive as right and wrong and 
what knowledge one actually acts upon? An answer to this question will hopefully 
become apparent as data is collected regarding how emerging adults gauge “right” 
and “wrong” and how they come to such positions. In other words, this present 
study may uncover data that closely resembles the conclusions from Murphy et al. 
in that emerging adults may not explicitly be persuaded or discuss reasons for 
adopting a new moral position. It may be that that transition is largely implicit. 
This leads to the two significant research questions of this study: Does dialogue 
function to influence or inform moral turning points in emerging adults? If so, 
how does dialogue function to influence or inform moral turning points in 
emerging adults? Murphy et al. (2009) contribute to the literature on moral 
communication by revealing that persons have moral responses ingrained in them 
and interesting questions surface when one starts to investigate the nature of these 
moral responses: how they came about and how they are expressed. Their 
contribution shows that persons take much longer to process and respond to 
narrative questions when stories go against the reader’s deeply held moral 
assumptions. This anecdote implies that there are differentiated methods for 
processing moral information or experience depending on whether moral 
outcomes parallel existing expectations or not. This helps the current study’s 
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focus by asking the above-mentioned questions as to the nature of dialogue in 
turning points. 
 Moral reasoning and information processing. Answering the question 
of how moral positions are learned or processed, Bargh and Chartrand (2000) 
discuss distinct qualities of information processing, which Murphy et al. (2009) 
draw on, to form greater understanding of how persons process moral 
information. The four qualities outlined by Bargh and Chartrand include: “(a) 
whether an individual has some awareness of the operations of the process under 
consideration (i.e. moral processing); (b) whether the process is efficient; (c) 
whether the process is unintentional; and (d) whether the process is under 
conscious control” (p. 43). Murphy et al. particularly drew on the second 
quality—efficiency of information processing—in order to capture the relative 
efficiency of moral automaticity. They found that at least some qualities of 
intuitive or automatic responsiveness apply to moral reasoning; namely, “it is an 
efficient process that persists despite a significant cognitive load” (p. 47). In other 
words, these findings indicate that moral reasoning is a deeply rooted process of 
human being that, at present, seems to occur mostly unintentionally without 
principled reasoning. These conclusions suggest that beliefs about morality find 
their expression in a socially complex and implicit manner. In order to better 
understand their uniqueness, scholars need to explore the relationship between 
these automatic, unintentional responses to immoral or moral experiences or ideas 
and the deeply rooted beliefs that supply them. In other words, it may be found in 
the current interview process that turning points are descriptive of a process in 
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which the automatic moral responses in participants are brought to light and 
questioned for their legitimacy or consistency.  
 Another explanation of moral negotiation emphasizes the role of peers and 
other social group members in moral ideological formation through the concept 
“moral testimony” (Hills, 2009). For Allison Hills, moral testimony is “a 
testimony with explicitly moral content” (p. 94). Through this lens, Hills’ reader 
is called to question the legitimacy of moral testimony from perceived “moral 
experts.” In fact, the very idea of expertise in negotiating what ought to be 
conceived as moral belief or action is called into question. As a result, moral 
understanding is defined as grasping the reasons behind any moral proposition 
and having the ability to enumerate and explain such reasons for a given moral 
position in a specific context. Hills explains this reasoning process in the 
following passage: 
The grasp of the reasons why p that is essential to understanding involves 
a number of abilities: to understand why p, you need to be able to treat q 
as the reason why p, not merely believe or know that q is the reason why 
p. If you understand why p (and q is why p), then in the right sort of 
circumstances, you can successfully: (i) follow an explanation of why p 
given by someone else; (ii) explain why p in your own words; (iii) draw 
the conclusion that p (or that probably p) from the information that q; (iv) 
draw the conclusion that p! (or that probably p!) from the information that 
q ! (where p! and q! are similar to but not identical to p and q); (v) given 
the information that p, give the right explanation, q. (p. 102) 
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In other words, this process of drawing out moral conclusions is intimately 
connected with logically working out the connective or causal reasons for holding 
a given position, supporting one’s positions with circumstantial intricacies that 
make every situation complexly different. Hills acknowledges that her epistemic 
assumptions about how to come to affirmative (factive as she terms them) moral 
reasons may be called into question:  
While according to some accounts, knowing how and propositional 
knowledge are distinct, there are well-known arguments that knowing how 
is a species of propositional knowledge. If these arguments apply to 
understanding why p as well as to knowledge how, one might conclude 
that moral understanding must be a species of propositional knowledge 
too. (2009, p. 105) 
Thus, Hills believes what separates mere adherence to a particular moral 
testimony from the ability to make mature moral judgments is the ability to start 
from “true beliefs” and learn to make “how” judgments that apply in unique 
circumstances (p. 105). In this she expresses the complexity of making situation-
specific judgments. Hills gives the following example of one who does not exhibit 
such complexity: 
Eleanor has always enjoyed eating meat but has recently realized that it 
raises some moral issues. Rather than thinking further about these, 
however, she talks to a friend, who tells her that eating meat is wrong, 
Eleanor knows that her friend is normally trustworthy and reliable, so she 
believes her and accepts that eating meat is wrong. (p. 94) 
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This passage features the idea that moral testimony, when not tested for value, is 
situated as a controversial method by which persons gather moral knowledge. 
Instead, Hills essay is dedicated to showing methods by which Eleanor can show 
greater complexity in the way that she comes to make moral judgments such as in 
the case of Mary: “Mary believes that she has a moral reason not to lie because 
lying to others fails to respect them and in the long run tends to make them 
unhappy” (p. 98). In this example, Mary does not rely on the testimony of trusted 
others. She thinks through the implications of lying and forms her positions based 
on these implications. Similarly, it would be beneficial to learn whether or not 
moral testimony, influence of others in a given context, proves to be prominent in 
emerging adults’ moral turning points. It will be interesting to explore the ways in 
which emerging adults make judgments. Hills’ concept of moral testimony 
reiterates the importance of understanding the topic of morality in terms of 
communicative negotiation. It is a process by which persons listen to and test 
others’ positions, making complex judgments or merely trusting and acting upon 
the conclusions in moral testimonies.  
 Thus far, there has been a review of social scientific literature regarding 
the nature of morality and communication as well as a review of philosophical 
writings on morality and what it means to be human. With these perspectives in 
mind, the following section will further express the dialogic nature of human 
communication, situating moral communication as a conversational negotiation 
of beliefs or ideas. This will be understood as a kind of societal, social, or 
communal sense making and will integrate various patterns of dialogue as integral 
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to negotiation. By addressing several caveats or applications of a dialogical theory 
of communication, the focus on dialogue in moral turning will find further 
support. Also, it will be noticed that a certain kind of dialogue, proposed by the 
following thinkers, is able to incite persons to be more mindful of their moral 
positions or behavior. It may be found that this greater awareness is characteristic 
in emerging adults’ moral turning points. First, an introduction will be provided 
that makes a case for emphasizing “the conversation” in understanding human 
communication. Secondly, some structural aspects of dialogue will be outlined 
that differentiate genuine or mindful dialogue from daily discursive practices. In 
this introduction to the structure of dialogue, the real possibility for change in 
understanding made possible by dialogue with others will be elucidated. Thirdly, 
Baxter and Braithwaite’s (2008) dialectic perspective on Bakhtin’s dialogical 
theory will be visited. Lastly, this section will provide an account of how dialogue 
facilitates a shift in orientation from, what Martin Buber terms, I-It orientation to 
I-Thou orientation. These insights together will provide a third body of literature 
from which this study will theorize emerging adults’ moral turning points. 
Moral Consciousness: A Dialogical Frame 
 Communication and conversation. Dialogic thinking reflects a 
fundamental emphasis on the value of learning through conversation with others 
and reflection on the content of dialogue between persons, within groups, and 
between groups according to a certain dialogic perspective, we engage with others 
by focusing on content questions, such as: to what do I want to belong, and why? 
These kind of questions help facilitate a particular quality of being together, one 
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characterized by learning about the Other through engagement in dialogue as 
opposed to unreflective belonging. This quality of relating is important in our 
society because, often, we take reflection for granted. Regularly, we 
unconsciously partake in normative discursive practices that maintain a minimal 
level of disclosure or understanding of the persons involved in dialogue. Though 
values provide the underlying framework for any relationship, they are not 
regularly brought to the fore.  
 Although daily communicative acts may be conceived as implicit or 
unconscious, this is not to say that is simplistic. Though relational or 
conversational partners may not be dissecting the values that support the content 
of any given conversation, these values and presuppositions are at work. Values, 
being culturally situated and socially learned, provide the content or knowledge 
for a range of activities in conversation including non verbal cues, attitudes, tones, 
topics, etc. Jesse Delia (1977) refers to this common ground between 
communicators as a shared knowledge (a set of beliefs or presuppositions) about 
the world that create the space for conversational partners to even be in 
communication. John Dewey (1944) suggests “we live in a community precisely 
by a shared embodiment of aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge—a common 
understanding” (p. 4) and this understanding is presented to our minds and senses 
through language. In fact, according to communication scholar Stanley Deetz 
(2003), “language is not simply a tool used to share experience but is intrinsic to 
and involved in developing the possibilities for experience” (p. 41). 
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 One important implication of this perspective of language and social 
relation is that we need to be aware of language’s impact on the way we make 
judgments or decisions about what we value. We are always in a social 
environment in which we test our judgments or moral knowledge. We are 
indebted to scholars who have espoused this important insight because it 
heightens our awareness of the many facets of dialogue. It is not simply 
transactional; it is a dynamic and systemic phenomenon. It is dynamic because it 
is always shifting and evolving with the progression of time and lived experience 
and it is systemic because it is only possible—only rich and beautiful—through 
our mutual investment in a share social world. Being together means doing the 
work of interpreting shared experiences and trying to describe or unpack those 
experiences that are not as closely shared.  
           Thus, Buber (1955) calls monologue, technical dialogue, and dialogue all 
relational, but only genuine dialogue is “where insight emerges between persons, 
insight that belongs to neither one nor the other” (as cited in Arnett, Fritz, & Bell, 
2009, p. 83). For Buber, genuine dialogue involves the creation or discovery of 
insight that does not belong to either conversational partner precisely because it is 
a product of the emergent responsiveness of both: “a human gift that brings 
insight and meaning beyond expectation” (2009, p. 84). This inception hints at the 
notion of turning by expressing that dialogue brings about an unexpected co-
mingling of past understandings with the insight of others, yielding an experience 
that reorients someone’s self concept. The various ways in which our values or 
moral conceptions shape the way we conceptualize our “self” and how we relate 
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with others are characterized by this constant sense of turning. Unlike 
technological dialogue, however, genuine dialogue slows the force with which 
practical, transactional language drives action. In genuine dialogue, one is invited 
to challenge his definition of “practical” or “valuable” and turn toward another 
morality embodiment.  
 Structure of dialogue. Arnett (2009) and his colleagues propose some 
dialogic coordinates to serve as a road map to a healthy dialogical disposition. As 
such, dialogic coordinates can help us think about healthy manners of turning. 
The following are the coordinates outlined in Arnett et al (2009):  
- Be a learner and a listener; attend to content or ground that shapes your 
own discourse and that of another. 
- Demand for dialogue moves us from dialogue into monologue and 
concern for our own image of how communication ‘should’ be. 
- Acknowledge bias; it is inevitable. To admit where one stands actually 
permits the possibility of change from new insight. 
- Acknowledge that not all communicative arrangements offer the 
possibility for dialogue. 
- Keep dialogue connected to content and learning, remaining ever 
attentive to new possibilities that emerge ‘between’ persons. 
- Find ways to nourish the natural dialectic of public and private 
communicative life, foregoing the temptation to blur them by trying to   
create ‘nice’ or friendly space from places that require some professional 
distance. (p. 92) 
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This kind of structure provides space for the exploration of differing 
presuppositions and valued ways of being or doing—embodiment of beliefs. Not 
many situations in life afford this opportunity. Our lives are filled with a kind of 
language that is adapted for specific communicative outcomes with expected 
ends. However, having a place (especially in emerging adulthood) to meet 
difference through genuine dialogue can have a positive influence on the growth 
or maturation of moral thinking. “Dialogic civility” is a term describing this kind 
of moral growth: 
[Dialogic civility] engages a form of communication architecture that 
attempts to design a place of communicative safety, not for all time, but 
for a moment, a temporal moment in which difference can meet with the 
project of learning, temporarily bracketing a triad of domination that seeks 
to defame, discount, dissect the Other. (Arnett & Arneson, 2001, p. 92) 
In this space, individuals’ communicative moral disposition is allowed to take 
shape. As Arnett et al. (2009) suggest, dialogic civility makes possible the idea of 
“places of sanctuary, places to think and places to work with ideas and to 
exchange them with others” (p. 92). Those who are somehow searching for or 
desiring an opportunity to meet “difference,” so to speak, need these places.  
 Understanding moral turning points through dialogical theory uncovers 
their ability to create a quality of “suspended” time, even if the suspension is 
more of a mood than a metaphysical reality. Arnett et al (2009) turn to the 
literature of music theory to describe this phenomenon. A dialogical 
understanding of communication is expressed in the term “‘rubato,’ in which one 
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takes the notes out of their normal rhythmical flow. Rubato gives one a sense of 
pause or elongated time” (p. 93). Through this slowing process, dialogue eases the 
forward inertia of existing moral conceptions in order to leave room for others to 
show forth. Emerging adulthood, as a result of the qualities that resonate in a 
similar fashion, presents itself as a period of life in which this mood is most 
salient or available. This presupposes the following dialogical attitudes:  
Dialogic ethics listens to what is before one, attends to the historical 
moment, and seeks to negotiate new possibilities. Dialogic ethics is a 
conceptual form of marketplace engagement, ever attentive to 
conversational partners and their ground, the historical moment, and the 
emerging ‘possible’ that takes place in the between of human meeting. 
(Arnett et al., 2009, p. 95) 
Finally, the phenomenon of communication from a dialogical perspective requires 
that genuine dialogue hinge on the ability to learn from the perspective of the 
Other. This task calls for an attentiveness and a willingness to let go of the 
demand to tell and, even, the demand for dialogue itself. 
 A dialectical perspective on Bakhtin’s dialogical theory.  Three key 
factors serve an important function in a truly dialogical understanding of 
communication and, thus, of human relating (Baxter & Braithwaite, 2008). The 
following are three propositions supporting the relevance of dialect tension in 
dialogue: 
Proposition 1: Meaning emerges from the struggle of different, often 
opposing, discourses. 
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Proposition 2: The interpenetration of discourses is both synchronic and 
diachronic. 
Proposition 3: The interpenetration of competing discourses constitutes 
social reality. (p. 351) 
 These insights are invaluable in the discussion of turning points because 
they conceive of turning points as both “momentous” and “gradual” (taking place 
over time). The explication of these three propositions will assist in making 
important connections between existing scholarly work and the value of 
understanding a dialogical theory of communication for exploring the 
communicative qualities of moral turning points in emerging adults. 
 As humans we are always-already engaged in systems of meaning-making 
through the interplay of different cultural discourses. Baxter and Braithwaite 
(2008) are interested in describing the intricate nature of this interplay and how 
communication and dialogue function to negotiate these variances in 
interpretation in order to have some semblance of coherence in one’s 
relationships. Drawing on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, Baxter and Braithwaite 
conceptualize relational dialectics in a characteristically Bakhtinian way when 
they express, “all meaning-making can be understood metaphorically and literally 
as a dialogue, that is, the simultaneous fusion and differentiation of different 
systems of meaning, or discourses” (p. 351). As a result, Baxter and Braithwaite 
do not see change as a fixed, neat system.  
 According to a dialogical understanding of communication and change, 
there are always already competing versions or interpretations of experience that 
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are informed by sometimes contradictory basic beliefs. Communication, 
understood in this way, implies these competing discourses are actively and 
simultaneously affecting our everyday conversations and actions. With this in 
mind, the first task of theorists in relational dialectics theory is to “[seek] to 
understand this dialectical process by (a) identifying the various discourses that 
are directly or indirectly invoked in talk to render utterances understandable and 
legitimate, and (b) asking how those discourses interpenetrate one another in the 
production of meaning” (Baxter & Braithwaite, 2008, p. 352). 
 Explained in Baxter and Braithwaite’s (2008) second proposition, 
synchronic interpenetration of discourses describes meaning as being expressed, 
articulated, or understood at a particular moment in time. This is opposed to a 
more dialogical perspective of the ways in which meanings ebb and flow, 
different sense-making frameworks become more or less salient over an indefinite 
period of time. This conception of meaning-making, understood as closer to a 
dialogical perspective of communication, is diachronic. If conceptualized as 
diachronic, communication is understood to bring some interpretations to the fore 
in some dialogue and other interpretations to the fore in other dialogue. In these 
terms, meanings that are created in dialogue between persons are “ultimately 
unfinalizable and ‘up for grabs’ in the next interactional moment” (2008, p. 353).  
 In many instances, the dialogical nature of communication also functions 
to emphasize certain meanings and not others (Baxter & Braithwaite, 2008). In 
fact, “some constructed meanings function to elude, or skirt, the struggle of 
discourses” (p. 353). Skirting happens when one discourse becomes the go-to and 
  
 
42 
other discourses are not found to be a part of the conversational mix; one 
discourse becomes dominant over others. According to Baxter and Braithwaite, 
“authoritative discourses are taken-for-granted or default, accepted as “true” or 
“reasonable” on their face” (p. 353). Interpreting this phenomenon in a dialogical 
scheme means understanding repeated emphasis of one discourse over another is 
not an ostensible, “objective” choice, but rather the latent or discursive character 
of communication in many circumstances. 
 Even though this kind of conceptual, dialogical favoring happens, it is not 
always such a clean distinction. When competing discourses come together in less 
neat ways, communicators experience an amalgamation, which Bakhtin (1981) 
terms a “hybrid” (p. 358). A hybrid is the bringing together of competing 
discourses to form an interpretive expression with aspects recognized in many 
diverging discourses. As a result, dialogical hybrids can be thought of as 
conceptual compromises on the part of communicators—though “the discourses 
are distinct, yet they combine to form a new meaning” (Baxter & Braithwaite, p. 
354). One cannot, with consistency, clearly distinguish between the participating 
belief structures that inform our dialogue or the dialogical outcomes of our 
everyday communicative encounters. This diluted combination is another way in 
which discourses meet. To reiterate, the “aesthetic moment” (Bakhtin, 1990, p. 
67), in which meanings are created and discourses informing conversation are not 
clearly distinguishable, creates a space for dialogue to bring about turning points. 
Transitioning from the dual nature of dialectic communication—diachronic and 
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synchronic—Baxter and Braithwaite outline the ways in which “the 
interpenetration of competing discourses constitutes social reality” (p. 355). 
 Social reality is fluid, ever-evolving, sculpting, and constitutive. The joint 
communicative activities that shape relationships are responsible for shaping 
everything from the ways in which language is employed in differing 
circumstances to the identities that we form in response to the process of 
“othering”—this process being one in which one’s formation of identity is 
directly related to what one conceives of as Other. This process of embodiment 
and interpenetration happens on the level of conceptualizing morality as well. We, 
at any given time (always-already), have a formed concept of what it means to be 
bad or immoral. Our response is to speak and act in ways that do not resemble the 
Other, in fact, in direct opposition. In an ongoing and diachronic way, we 
experience “fluid and dynamic relations between different perspectives,” (Baxter 
& Braithwaite, p. 356) which constitutive our social, moral reality. In 
summarizing the constitutive nature of the interpenetration of differing discourses, 
Baxter and Braithwaite write: 
The constitutive proposition in [relational dialectics theory] (RDT) moves 
us away from questions about individual subjectivity and the strategic 
deployment of communication to accomplish desired goals. Instead, it 
moves us to a focus on discourse and the joint activities of parties. (p. 357) 
In relation to conceptualizing the character of emerging adults’ moral turning 
points, this would imply that moral understanding is realized in the embodiment 
of the shared activity of daily communication and dialogue. This means that 
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“rather than presupposing the [social] world exists ‘out there’ prior to 
communication… RDT joins other social constructionist theories in positioning 
communication as the constitutive mechanism through which we make the social 
world meaningful” (p. 356). One of the concepts used to define a meaningful 
world is what comes to be considered a moral social world. In order to clarify, 
one could pose the following questions: What is the best way to talk to others? 
What ought the content of our dialogue to be? These questions constitute what a 
communicator might mean when they say “a meaningful social world” in terms of 
morality. 
 Relational Dialectics Theory helps us to ask the question: What are the 
competing moral discourses that interpenetrate and constitute dialogue between 
emerging adults? Asking this important question implies a focus on the function 
of opposing discourses or moral messages on dialogue and action. It also hints at 
an interest in the ensuing outcome or character of “hybrid,” or “aesthetic” 
embodiment of certain moral positions. Through the lens of this scholarly work, it 
may be found that moral turning points consist of a sharp contrast in moral 
reasoning, communication thus functioning in a synchronic manner which brings 
one discourse to the forefront of everyday action above and beyond an existing 
moral conception. Or, it may be discovered that the character of moral turning is 
diachronic, the shift expressing a melding of diverging moral discourses (existing 
and newly adopted). Based on these theoretical analyses, this present study 
anticipates a dialogical character of moral turning whereby moral beliefs or ideas 
will be negotiated through the active engagement in dialogue with others. 
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Furthermore, it is expected that this dialogue will be indicative of emerging 
adults’ attempt to understand morality in deeper, more intricate ways. That they 
may come to perceive the influence of competing discourses as well as how 
others create frameworks that take these discourses into account. The following 
conversation regarding the work of Martin Buber will shed light on how this 
awareness of the Other comes about. 
 Toward an I-Thou, Other-centered dialogical orientation. Neher and 
Sandin (2007) outline a communication ethic that highlights the work of Martin 
Buber. In their work, Neher and Sandin direct attention to an I-Thou orientation to 
the social world instead of an I-It orientation. The concept of one’s orientation to 
others in the social world is one of great importance in a dialogical understanding 
of communication phenomena. Etymologically, “orientation” brings out an 
appreciation for the bearing or position one has when relating with others. One’s 
bearing is affected by a number of different variables, all of which describe an 
attitude or disposition of either openness to the possibilities of social interaction 
or a deceivingly confident sense of fore-guidance in conversational interaction. In 
the latter, which Buber describes as an I-It orientation, communicators treat 
dialogue as a tool instead of a “deeper, more intimate, way in which subject 
converses with subject” (Neher & Sandin, 2007, p. 91). Greater intimacy is a 
central quality of communication because it emphasizes the closeness one can 
have with another through communication. This closeness only comes when 
communicators are invested in dialogue in such a way as to construct an authentic 
image of the other person (through shared knowledge that is built and reinforced 
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in relationship or conversation) “rather than as an objectified person for whom we 
notice the features, peculiarities, or small details” (p. 91). Sharing and learning 
from others, through dialogue, constitutes a unique quality of social life. 
 Accordingly, the intersection of learning and education that is influenced 
by dialogue with the Other is pivotal in gaining wisdom in moral judgment.  In 
fact, Neher and Sandin have “posited that ethics begins first and foremost in 
person-to-person contact” (p. 94). It is in the meeting, or dialogue, between 
persons that ethics or morality becomes salient precisely because morality seeks 
to answer the question of how persons ought to live together. As a result, morality 
becomes something that is negotiated in a way as to happen in and by the 
experience of communication and shared action, not objectively or apart from 
shared experience. However, often persons think of morality as an abstract or 
strictly theoretical topic that is not applicable in any particularly practical 
instance. Neher and Sandin (2007) express a similar inference from students’ 
perspectives in their communication ethics courses: 
As we teach the course every semester, tweaking the material based on 
what we ourselves are learning, we realize that ethics for many of our 
students is strictly theoretical, almost without shape or form in their 
understanding. We believe that dialogical ethics gives our students (and 
ourselves) a clearer, more understandable platform on which we can judge 
ethical behavior. (p. 95) 
Scholars theorizing the dialogical character of everyday communicative 
negotiation inform the current work in very important ways. Their theorizing 
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supports the understanding that the behavior of interpretation and the role of 
communication, relationships, and ideas are integral in the conceptual negotiation 
of morality (right or wrong, good or bad actions and/or beliefs). Baxter and 
Braithwaite (2008) urge researchers to: 
Engage the issue of how meanings are constituted from the 
interpenetration of opposing discourses. In so doing, RDT research will be 
more responsive to the criticism of, “so what?” It means little for 
researchers to simply list discursive tensions unless they also take the next 
step of rendering intelligible how the struggle of competing discourses 
constitutes meaning. (p. 359) 
This study aims to do just that. By creating a rich description of the ways in which 
communication functions to manage opposing conceptions of “the good,” more 
understanding can be gathered about the tensions that face communicators in the 
constitution of what it means to be a moral person— as it relates to actions as well 
as beliefs. By analyzing the character of moral turning points through a dialogical 
lens—akin to that of Bakhtin, Baxter, and others—this study aims to elucidate the 
multifarious ways by which dialogue affects change in persons’ ideas about 
morality, as well as the affective change in one’s actions. Baxter and Braithwaite 
(2008) posit a few methods by which future research may be communicated: 
“Shifting from isolated utterances, or even single conversations, to the more 
complete utterance ‘chain’ will involve taking into analytic account three different 
kinds of data” (2008, p. 360). Their suggestions about data come in the following 
forms and may provide an organizing scheme for the thematic content that will be 
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collected in qualitative interviews about persons’ emerging adulthood experience, 
as it relates to moral turning points. 
 1. Discursive history of past utterances in the relationship. 
2. The broader cultural discourse that relationship parties jointly draw on 
as resources in making intelligible utterances in the present. 
3. The anticipated responses from others (including relationship parties 
themselves) in the future. (p. 360) 
The anticipated responses can be conceptualized as the new relationship of ideas 
resulting from the dialogical, moral turning. This could be a hybrid of old and 
new beliefs that express themselves in a corroborative manner or a distinctly 
different moral disposition. Regardless of the specifics of the change, the 
dialogical affect of moral turning during emerging adulthood is expected to 
reinforce and reproduce a quality of communication that is extended into the 
future. This interpretation will only have validity if the case can be made that 
emerging adulthood is a truly significant time of moral development and that a 
dialogical approach to understanding turning points accurately captures the 
character of communication about morality during this period. The following 
section will address current research in turning point theory and hypothesize the 
manner in which this topic will be expressed in the specific context of this study. 
Communication and Turning Points  
Turning point theory provides a way of understanding transitions in    
persons’ communicative experience. Given as an alternative to theorizing from a 
stage perspective, turning points are seen as extraordinary periods of development 
  
 
49 
or reconceptualization related to how a person’s understanding of the world, and 
relationships therein, shift.  A turning point refers to “a transformative event that 
alters a relationship in some important way, either positively or negatively” 
(Baxter, Braithwaite & Nicholson, 1999, p. 294). This particular theoretical lens 
emphasizes the developmental changes through which relationships “traverse in 
light of factors such as normative ideological shifts, introspection, dyadic 
examination, and circumstantial change” (Surra & Huston, 1987). The 
communicative content with which researchers working in the turning point 
paradigm are interested can be seen in the following questions from a study on 
blended families by Baxter et al. (1999):  
What are the primary types of events that are perceived as turning points 
in the first 48 months of blended family development? What are the 
primary trajectories of development for blended families? Does the current 
level of reported family bonding correlate with the trajectory of blended 
family development? (p.295)        
These questions aim at discovering how turning points theory serves as a 
foundation for understanding the unique characteristics of communication during 
periods of transformation or change. Furthermore, the distinct nature of turning 
points has implications for the types of communication behaviors or responses 
that would be expected to be present. In order to understand how communication 
during periods of transition is different from other types of communication, it is 
necessary to create a taxonomy of the ways in which communication functions to 
assist transition or change. For example, the function of communication in turning 
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points has been categorized by Baxter and Pittman (2001) as, first “intrapersonal 
or normative in nature; that is, events in which the individuals cognitively 
evaluate the relationship according to normative expectations of relating” (p. 4). 
They give the example of one turning point in which “one person concludes 
privately that she has met the ‘perfect mate’” (p. 5). However, this is not always 
the case. Sometimes persons experience turning in the form of dyadic events, in 
which the focus is on the interaction between communicators. This is exemplified 
in experiences where couples make a prominent decision together (i.e. to break 
up, get engaged, etc.). The third category of turning point events, which Baxter 
and Pittman put forward, “consists of those situated in interactions with social 
network members; for example, the presence of former romantic partners, 
competing demands for time from friends, meeting the partner’s family for the 
first time, or experiencing objection to the relationship from family or friends” (p. 
5). The fourth category describes a situation in which the factors influencing a 
change in character extend to a broader network. However, turning point events 
have not solely resulted from the direct influence of relational partners or broader 
social networks. It has also been discovered that circumstances beyond persons’ 
control play a role in turning points: for example, “physical separations related to 
work or school in different geographic locations” (Baxter & Pittman, 2001, p.5). 
  These four categories are important points of reference in conceptualizing 
how communication facilitates turning. They indicate that the anatomy of turning 
points is complex and can be described in a number ways. Likewise, turning 
points can be composed of a “mix of events, experiences, sudden illuminations, 
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and gradual realizations” (King et al, 2003, p. 192). Consequently, some turning 
points are related to major life events while others result from common 
developmental transitions. Regardless of their outworking, turning points indicate 
an important communicative theme. Namely, understanding communication 
involves perceiving an intricate system of influence in which persons are always 
in a position of responding to fellow members of society. In fact, one’s position in 
life is defined as such precisely due to one’s relation with others. Experience 
works in a synonymous fashion. Our experiences are a dynamic web of layered 
interpretations; moments that blur in a canvas of saturated meaning. This 
saturation of meaning lends itself to research that is focused on expressing the 
complexity of life’s interrelatedness. It should be noted that this conception of the 
experience of turning closely resembles the ideas put forward in Baxter and 
Braithwaite’s relational dialectics theory. As was stated earlier, persons bring 
together competing discourses to form a worldview with aspects recognized in 
many diverging discourses. As a result, dialogical hybrids can be thought of as 
conceptual compromises on the part of communicators. Though “the discourses 
are distinct, yet they combine to form a new meaning” (Baxter & Braithwaite, p. 
354). It is clear how these two bodies of literature intersect naturally, the 
constitutive qualities relating in terms of the divergence of ideas affecting change 
in behavior. Thus, any study of turning points cannot be “complete” without 
taking into account the effect of dialogue on the way persons respond to their 
social world and the diverging discourses therein.  
 As a result, this study focuses on turning points because they are a unique 
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blend of gradual reflection and growth, while retaining moments of sudden 
realization or distinct interstice. Recent theorists have alluded to the elusive nature 
of turning points and maintained, “qualitative research is especially suited for an 
in-depth exploration of complex issues that are not well understood, which is the 
case for turning points” (Rutter, 1985; Zimmerman & Arunkumar, 1994). Getting 
a glimpse into the nature of turning points means capturing something unique 
about the nature of time, making it hard to define.  Time takes on qualities that 
deceive and mislead. For example, it may surprise some participants that their 
moral turning happened over such a long period of time while some may feel that 
the “measured” time of a turning point event does not do justice to importance of 
the turning on their starkly different conception of morality as an adult. Due to 
time’s peculiar nature, one is often at a loss to describe the culminating factors 
that serve as pivotal influences in his/her life (Bruner, 1994; Singer & Powers, 
1993). Consequently, this study takes a narrative approach to interviewing 
participants. As will be discussed in more detail later, it is hoped that by allowing 
participants to retrospectively reflect on the pivotal years between 18 and 25, 
more insight will be gained about how transition during this life stage occurs.  
Emerging Adulthood 
            Emerging adulthood (18 to 25 years old) is distinct from adolescence and 
young adulthood (Arnett, 2000). The existence of emerging adulthood as a unique 
category is due to a cultural situation in which individuals experience a 
“prolonged period of independent role exploration during the late teens and 
twenties” (p. 469). As a result, young people experience development in a 
  
 
53 
different way than early social scientists have explicated. For many, it is a time of 
frequent change as various possibilities in love, work, and worldviews are 
explored (Erikson, 1968; Rindfuss, 1991). Of particular importance to 
communication scholars is the increasing longevity of this time in life where 
transitions multiply and exploration of possible future direction deepens. Due to 
changes in societal expectations surrounding an age appropriate for marriage and 
career solidification, the nature of development has been dramatically altered: 
Emerging adulthood is distinguished by relative independence from social 
roles and from normative expectations. Having left the dependency of 
childhood and adolescence, and having not yet entered the enduring 
responsibilities that are normative in adulthood, emerging adults often 
explore a variety of possible life directions in love, work, and worldviews. 
(Arnett, 2000, p. 469) 
Emerging adults go through fundamental changes as a result of this limbo. In a 
state where norms and responsibilities are in suspension, persons have the 
opportunity to experience the development of individual morality in an interesting 
way. This limbo gives rise to an environment that is more conducive to turning 
because lasting commitments to particular ways of embodying morality are not in 
place. For example, since emerging adulthood extends the period of time in which 
a person can date, it also affords emerging adults more time to shape their views 
about the nature of marriage. The difference in emerging adults’ experience of 
communication about morality might be analogous to buying a pair of shoes 
online as opposed to buying a pair of shoes in a department store. With an online 
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experience, much like young adulthood before the current cultural milieu, one 
“knows” his size and stylistic bent and orders accordingly. In a department store, 
on the other hand, one comes with a similar normative “knowledge” but also 
relies on the experience of trying the shoe on. In various ways communication can 
be understood as the phenomena through which morality is “tried on.” 
 Interestingly, turning points seem to come about when the contradictory 
experiences or forces of social relation intersect in the development of a young 
person. Emerging adulthood literature highlights the particular tension between 
themes of change or instability while simultaneously trying to “move into the 
adult world and build a stable life structure” (Arnett, 2000, p. 470). One reason 
that research points to emerging adulthood as an especially interesting site for 
deeper understanding is the high level of differentiation and unpredictably in 
terms of demographics. Contrarily, “about 75% of 30-year-olds have married, 
about 75% have become parents, and fewer than 10% are enrolled in school” (p. 
471). In other words, researchers and statisticians have found it difficult to predict 
demographic connectors, such as marital status or career status, on age alone in 
persons between the age of 18 and 25 because these persons do not seem to have 
few particular qualities or behaviors in common.  
 By way of this insight, emerging adults seem to escape quantification; 
evidence that rich qualitative explication is needed. This study is aimed at adding 
to existing literature by potentially finding a shared quality of experience in moral 
turning. However, any claims of similarity will be qualified because of the 
difficulty in generalizing from such a small sample, garnered through purposive 
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sampling. Prior ways of defining what it means to be an adult are no longer salient 
to the current generation of emerging adults and it is left for future research to try 
and give a rich description of what persons in this life stage share. Arnett (2000) 
begins this work by concluding, “on the top of the list of criteria for emerging 
adults’ conception of actual adulthood are things that reflect autonomy in decision 
making and other aspects of life” (p. 472). This may be due to the fact that in 
emerging adulthood there is more experimentation that happens with various roles 
because the enduring quality of adult roles is not present. This would mean that 
emerging adults share the experience of experimentation in processes that lead to 
building greater levels of autonomy and decision making skill. 
 On this point, most of the research on changes in worldview during 
emerging adulthood involving college students and graduate students has shown 
evidence that higher education (a factor that plays an important role in emerging 
adulthood) promotes exploration and reconsideration of world views (Pascarella 
& Terenzini, 1991). However, it is notable that emerging adults who do not attend 
college are as likely as college students to indicate that deciding on their own 
beliefs and values is an essential criterion for attaining adult status (Arnett, 1997). 
Also, research on emerging adults’ religious beliefs suggests that regardless of 
educational background, they consider it important during emerging adulthood to 
reexamine the beliefs they have learned in their families and to form a set of 
beliefs that is the product of their own independent reflections (Arnett, Ramos & 
Jensen, 2001; Hoge, Johnson, & Luidens, 1993). 
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 As this study aims to show, however, the seemingly independent 
reflections in emerging adulthood are not independent. Rather, communication in 
various contexts allows emerging adults to explore different worldviews. Arnett, 
Ramos, Jensen (2001) describe one way of understanding how emerging adults 
engage in this kind of negotiation in their study on ideological views in emerging 
adulthood. In this study they sampled 140 emerging adults to participate in 
interviews and used Shweder’s ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity (as 
cited in Jensen, 1995, 1997a, 1997b: Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) 
to examine ideological thinking from ages 20 to 29. In this study, autonomy 
situated the individual as a primary moral authority as opposed to defining 
morality in terms of the commitments and obligation one has to a group (i.e. 
Community). The third, divinity, was distinguished from autonomy and 
community by defining the “individual as a spiritual entity, subject to the 
prescriptions of a spiritual or natural order” (Arnett et al., 2001, p. 70). Their 
coding process was as follows: 
Responses to the two questions were coded separately. Each response was 
coded for the use of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity. If any part of 
the response indicated use of a particular ethic, the ethic was coded as 
used by that participant for that question. The coding of responses was not 
mutually exclusive; it was possible for a response to be coded for 
Autonomy as well as for Community, or Community and Divinity, and so 
on. (p. 72) 
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The two questions that were asked of participants were aimed at understanding 
what participants felt was important to pass on to the next generation and what 
participants would think about their lives once they were older, looking back. 
Quantitatively, the results showed a mixture of ethics at work in the participants’ 
responses. However, the frequency of autonomy and community far outweighed 
references to the divinity ethic. An example of this finding was illustrated when 
Arnett et al. (2001) reported the following passage from a 27-year-old participant: 
“I think I would pass on other values and beliefs other than religious beliefs... I 
would pass on values of self-esteem rather than religious values” (p. 77). As will 
be outlined in the method section of this study, this passage closely resembles the 
kind of qualitative data that will be used to report dialogic functions in moral 
turning points. Emerging adulthood is still a relatively new conceptualization of 
lifespan development, however it is quickly garnering much evidence as to the 
validity of its claims. It provides an opportunity to theorize the influence of 
cultural or economic change on a particular age group. For these reasons, this age 
range has become the focus for the current exploration on moral turning points. 
Rationale for Research Questions 
 Studying communication with a dialogic focus has been the approach of 
many researchers. Dialogue is experienced early on in life and continues to grow 
in complexity as persons grow older. By observing dialogue, theorists have 
pointed out the multi-layered nature of meaning making in conversation (Delia, 
1977; Martsin, 2010). This is one way in which persons understand what it means 
for them to participate in families, be a good friend, participate in a religious 
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community (or not), participate in the political process of society, etc. Owing to 
dialogue’s influential role in the formation of such ideas, it is essential to 
understand the manner in which persons engage in dialogue. The following 
research questions communicate this study’s goal of exploring and understanding 
dialogue’s role in the context of emerging adults’ moral turning points. 
R.Q. 1. Does dialogue play an important role in shaping moral turning points 
during emerging adulthood? 
R.Q. 2. In what ways does dialogue influence the character of moral turning 
points during emerging adulthood?  
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Chapter Four: Method 
Participants  
 Demographics. The population in focus was 25 to 30 year-olds who had 
experienced a turning point(s) in their understanding of morality. A total of 10 
interviews were completed over a period of a month, from August to September. 
Four of the participants were female (n=4) and six were male (n=6). Although this 
study included a low number of participants, the variation in participants’ 
experience, beliefs, and cultural background was significant. Three participants 
were married and seven were unmarried. One participant had not completed any 
college-level course work. Two were in the midst of undergraduate coursework 
and seven participants were currently in graduate school. Nationalities represented 
in the sample include: Germany, the United Arab Emirates, Mexico, Romania and 
the United States. Three of the participants reported having been brought up 
without any religious affiliation while one reported having been raised Mormon 
and six reported having been raised with Christian. In their adult lives (i.e. after 
25), three reported no religious affiliation (no belief in God or inclusion in a faith 
community of any kind); three reported belief in God without any particular 
institutional or doctrinal affiliation; four reported belief in God with a particular 
religious affiliation (e.g. Reformed Presbyterianism, Mormonism, Catholicism).   
Sampling. The first five participants were invited to participate in the 
study because the researcher had prior knowledge indicating that they fit the 
scope of inquiry. It is widely noted by scholars in the social sciences that this kind 
of convenience or purposive sampling is not particularly reliable and makes it 
  
 
60 
extremely difficult (if not impossible) to generalize findings. However, it is 
important that: 
Although the convenience sample can be perceived as a study limitation, it 
can still turn up rich data. Paradoxically, the same close relationship 
between researcher and research site that makes a sample convenient often 
grants the researcher a level of access to and familiarity with the sample 
that guarantees a richness of data that could not be attained if the sample 
were less familiar, and therefore less convenient, to the researcher. 
(Koerber & McMichael, 2008, p. 463) 
In other words, knowledge of the first five participants’ experience of morality 
allowed the researcher to make a judgment about the relevance of their journey. 
This knowledge was important because this study brings together diverse bodies 
of inquiry—moral negotiation and turning points in the context of emerging 
adulthood—narrowing the field of eligible participants. An attempt was made to 
diversify the sample by asking initial participants to invite members of their social 
network to participate. Trying to account for the narrow criteria field, two 
participants were informed about the study through snowball sampling. Primary 
participants were “able to provide information needed to locate other members of 
that population” (Baxter & Babbie, 2004, p. 135). The final three participants 
were contacted through networking with a student at an international business 
school. A sifting survey was created on Surveymonkey.com that asked questions 
ensuring criteria for the study was met. Questions included: Are you between the 
age of 25 and 30? Have you experienced a turning point(s) in the way you 
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understood morality between the age of 18 and 25? Would you be willing to 
participate in one, hour-long interview? There were 22 responses to the survey but 
only three met all of the criteria for the study. All participants were given $10 
Starbucks gift cards for their participation in the interview. 
Rationale for sampling methods. As noted by Baxter and Babbie (2004), 
some “research is often characterized by an emergent sampling strategy in which 
multiple sampling techniques are used over the course of data gathering” (p. 314). 
Again, the specificity of subject matter and the limited time frame allotted for data 
collection in this study made it necessary to rely on this mixture of convenience, 
judgmental, or snowball sampling. It may be the case that an overwhelming 
number of persons discuss issues of right or wrong actions or beliefs. However, it 
was necessary for this study to rely on the non-probabilistic sampling methods 
because “the enumeration of them all would be nearly impossible” (Baxter & 
Babbie, 2004, p. 135).  
Procedures 
 Setting. Each participant was involved in one interview that lasted 60 
minutes to 90 minutes. Most interviews (n=7) were conducted on campus in study 
rooms at a local state university campus. Two interviews were conducted in 
participants’ homes and one interview was conducted in a study room on campus 
at the international business school.  
 Preparing for interviews. Participants were given an information letter 
that defined “morality” and “turning points” two weeks prior to the interview 
date.  In this letter, participants were given several questions that prompted them 
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to think about specific conversations or turning point events. The following 
prompts were compiled and included in an email to each participant preceding 
interviews:  
- Think about how you define morality and some key moral issues that 
you are passionate about or that have been important in your life. (e.g. 
for some, abortion or same-sex marriage are important issues while 
others may be concerned about religious affiliation or participation, 
etc.).  
- Has dialogue or conversation played a role in the forming of your 
beliefs regarding these moral issues? Think about specific instances... 
(e.g. This one time at the gym, my roommate and I talked about same-
sex marriage... She/He said this... I responded like that, etc...) 
- What was the tone of conversations? What was said? How it was said? 
How did you respond? These are the kinds of details that will be 
important to recount in the interview.  
- What conversations have had the greatest impact on you in changing 
the way you make choices or understand morality?  
These questions were formulated in response to the design considerations 
discussed in the King et al (2003) study. They found it important, in order to elicit 
as much contextual description as possible, to provide participants with a cover 
letter which explained some possible ambiguities in the study content: 
In the letter, we defined turning points as events, experiences, or 
realizations that could be positive or negative in nature and cumulative or 
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sudden in occurrence. We asked participants to prepare for the interviews 
by thinking about how their turning points came about, what made those 
events or experiences important in their lives, and what helped or hindered 
their adaptation to the turning points. (p. 189) 
 Interview process. Interviews began with the obtaining of verbal consent 
from participants. Participants were then asked to describe the communication of 
moral issues during childhood— recalling specific conversations, giving details 
about setting of conversations, messages that were communicated in 
conversations, and the ways in which these messages were communicated. These 
questions were mostly open-ended questions. Thus, the interview can be 
characterized as semi-structured, allowing participants to have ample opportunity 
for a detailed reflection of moral development in childhood and emerging 
adulthood. Examples of preliminary questions include: When you were a child, 
did your family discuss moral issues? How did your parents talk to you about 
issues of right and wrong? What issues were considered “moral” to your family? 
What did those conversations look like? What did you take away from “X” 
conversation (about a given moral issue) growing up? In discussing each turning 
point or important transitional conversations, secondary questions were asked in 
order to clarify or obtain more detailed information such as: What exactly did “X” 
person say? What did you say in response? Where did that conversation take 
place? How, exactly, was that message communicated? Participants were also 
asked to describe what effect, if any, these conversations or messages had on their 
beliefs or behavior. Obtaining a detailed description was important in this study 
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because, as current literature on turning points supports, “past events may become 
perceived as transformative turning points only through the retrospective 
hindsight that comes when the parties communicate subsequently about those 
events” (Baxter & Pittman, 2001, p. 6). This effect is also true of narrative-telling 
in general, functioning to bind together disparate events into a more 
understandable, interpretable whole (Goldberg, 1982). Also, “turning point 
interviews afford participants the opportunity to consider and interpret the 
moments at which their relationships were significantly altered (either positively 
or negatively), and to describe the context of these transformations. Analyses 
reveal patterns in relationship trajectories which are useful in understanding 
relational change” (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996).   
 Conversational approach. Collecting and analyzing personal narratives 
through qualitative interviews, while focusing on case-specific examples of 
turning points, fit the exploratory or dialogical nature of this study most aptly. 
Understanding that personal narrative interviews are somewhat of a co-creation 
(interviewer— interviewee), interview questions were open-ended so as to allow 
interviews to be “more linguistically sophisticated and ethically engaged” 
(Anneke A.J. van Enk, 2009, p. 1269) and were informed by several studies’ 
methodologies. For example, from the turning point literature, King et al. (2003) 
asked open-ended questions and follow-up prompts of their participants. They 
describe some key questions asked: “Have there been key turning points (events, 
experiences, or realizations) in your life? What were they? And: When and how 
did they occur?” (p. 189).   
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Researchers have found this kind of narrative expression of life 
experience, especially in ascertaining greater understanding of turning points, to 
be advantageous in many ways. An important concept in narrative expression, 
internal continuity, is “associated with psychological identity that is developed 
through the process of connecting past and present life events, and by which the 
present is reinforced by change and ongoing interaction with others” (Coupland & 
Nussbaum, 1993, p. 176). This type of reflection is important to work that seeks 
to understand communicative qualities surrounding turning points because it asks 
participants to reflect upon the details of past conversations that have influenced 
their beliefs and actions. Consequently, narrative expression gives participants the 
opportunity to reflect upon change (in this case, moral or ethical) in the course of 
their experience. Furthermore, going through the thoughtful labor of narrating 
one’s past experience and reflecting upon the role communication and, 
specifically, dialogue had in shaping one’s concept of moral or ethical behavior 
will influence future experience that will call forth similar processes of growth 
and change. As a result, it is claimed that participation in narrative expression 
may provide a better foundation for future ethical communication considerations 
(Coupland & Nussbaum, 1993, p. 177).  
 Obtaining dialogue details. One issue that arose, due to the loose 
structure of interviews, was the tendency for participants to describe general 
impressions of experience, internal feelings or thoughts without thoroughly 
describing details of experiences (i.e. what was said, where it was said, who said 
it). In order to address this concern, a method of questioning was adopted similar 
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to that used in Docan-Morgan and Manusov’s (2009) study on turning point 
events in college teacher and student relationships. In their study, Docan-Morgan 
and Manusov interviewed students regarding turning points and their outcomes in 
student-teacher relationships. They utilized the critical incident technique 
(Flanagan, 1954) in order to understand students’ perceptions of change as a 
result of specific turning points. By using this method of questioning, Docan-
Morgan and Manusov avoided common problems in qualitative interviewing, 
namely, “by focusing on a specific event, the contextual and case-specific nature 
of the phenomena under investigation [was] captured” (2009, p. 161). These kinds 
of case-specific questions led participants to describe, in detail, what verbal 
messages were present in turning points. In addition, participants were asked to 
describe why and how these messages elicited change in their understanding of 
morality.   
Method for Analyzing Data 
 Function of dialogue as the unit of measure. The interest of this study 
lay in the function of dialogue in moral negotiation; what communication about 
moral issues practically looked like in participants’ conversations (as self-reported 
by participants). Retrospective self-reports have been valued as a productive and 
reliable means of obtaining information about behaviors that, for the most part, 
are not accessible through direct observation (i.e. instances of dialogue that 
inform moral turning) (Metts, Sprecher, & Cupach, 1991). Therefore, the content 
of moral issues was not the focus of analysis, but the themes are noteworthy. The 
moral issues that arose in interviews included subjects such as belief in God, 
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stealing, premarital sex, the nature or definition of marriage, same sex 
relationships, work ethic, etc. The focus of data collection was on describing how 
messages were constructed and communicated: the intended goal of dialogue as 
well as the ways in which the messages inspired a change in understanding on the 
part of participants during emerging adulthood. Much of the existing literature on 
turning points explores and describes the types of turning point events (i.e. King 
et al., 2003). Others, like in the Baxter, Braithwaite, and Nicholson (1999) study 
on turning points in blended families, analyze this phenomenon in terms of the 
amplitude and sequencing of turning points. For example, Baxter et al. (1999) 
posed several research questions that expected the following trajectory: “Some 
blended families may be reported to accelerate quickly toward family bonding, 
whereas others may report progressing more slowly and gradually” (Baxter et al., 
1999, p. 296). They found that, in fact, the acceleration of blended family bonding 
correlated positively with the acceleration of blended family development. The 
focus of their findings was on the way in which different turning point events 
correlate with family bonding trajectories. In analyzing their data, Baxter et al. 
drew upon quantitative methods. This allowed them to analyze the frequency of 
turning point events and compare the percentage of turning points perceived as 
bringing positive change versus those that were perceived to bring negative 
change.  
 In contrast, the present study employed a textual or content analysis 
approach, which involved transcribing statements that influenced or prompted 
moral turning points. The unit of measure in each case was the function of various 
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moral messages. In this study, “function” was conceptualized as that which 
emerging adults and/or their relational counterparts accomplished, or tried to 
accomplish, through different styles of message delivery in moral turning point 
conversations. In each case, themes were introduced in terms of how they 
answered the following questions: How is this emerging adult participating in or 
“using” dialogue in this turning point event? How is the conversational partner 
influencing this participant’s moral turning by their style of message delivery in 
dialogue? In explicating the various functions of dialogue in the discussion of 
results it will be clearer how these components of dialogue functions to shape 
participants’ beliefs and actions during emerging adulthood. In the process of 
analyzing, the messages would be judged as either similar (incorporated in the 
same category) or dissimilar in which case a new theme of dialogic function was 
created. These themes were revisited several times to delineate and refine them 
(Crabtree & Miller, 1991; Fiese & Bickman, 1998). Other scholars have 
conducted qualitative studies which aim to discern abstract functions of 
communication. For example, in Kelley’s (1998) inductive study of forgive 
processes, three judges employed the following method in ascertaining themes: 
“(1) recurrence in semantic meaning wherein different language expresses the 
same concept, (2) repetition of words, phrases or concepts, and (3) intensity, 
which typically is indicated by paralanguage or gesturing” (Owen, 1984, as cited 
in Kelley, 1998).  
 Grounded theory. This refining resulted in a taxonomy that explains and 
describes the types of dialogue that played a role in turning points. This kind of 
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constant-comparative analysis work comes from a grounded theory approach in 
analyzing participants’ dialogue. Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss (1990) note, 
when taking a grounded theory approach, “since phenomena are not conceived of 
as static but as continually changing in response to evolving conditions, an 
important component of the method is to build change, through process, into the 
method” (p. 5). In their work, Corbin and Strauss describe several features of 
grounded theory. In terms of canons and procedures, they give a more formal, 
systematic method by which to conduct a qualitative analysis.  
 The first procedure explains that analysis begins as soon as the first bit of 
data is collected. For example, the analysis of data in this study was commenced 
as soon as the first interview was completed. This is important because the 
insights from the preliminary analysis are used to “direct the next interview and 
observations” (p. 6). In other words, the themes that came out of the transcription 
of the first interview informed a new kind of vocabulary for the ensuing 
examples. For example, upon analyzing the first interview, it was observed that 
some dialogue was filled with messages that challenged existing moral 
frameworks. Therefore, when similar examples of dialogue arose in the second 
interview, the interviewee was asked: “Do you think that conversation served to 
challenge your prior beliefs? Explain.” The resulting explanation served to 
reinforce and clarify the characteristics of different dialogic themes. In this way, 
“each concept earns its way into the theory by repeatedly being present in 
interviews, documents, and observations in some form or another—or by being 
significantly absent” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 7).  
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 The second procedure describes the process by which concepts become 
“more numerous and more abstract” (p. 7). As this happens, a concept like 
“challenging” dialogue is enumerated in such a way that it is more clearly 
differentiated from other dialogic functions such as “inviting” dialogue or 
“exemplifying” dialogue. Through this process of abstraction, concepts serve as 
units of analysis for communication phenomena (e.g. the function of dialogue in 
moral turning points).  
 The next procedural step is to develop categories integrating the various 
conceptual themes. This higher level integration is accomplished by revisiting 
concepts and deciphering whether they can be put into more abstract categories or 
not. “All of [these] observations would be qualified by noting the conditions 
under which the phenomena occur, the action/interactional form they take, the 
consequence that result, and so forth” (p. 9). For example, this means analytic 
work has to be done to explicate the ways in which disturbing, educative, and 
maintaing forms of dialogue work together in moral turning points. 
 Grounded theorists go further in this work, continuing to make greater 
conceptual comparisons, noticing and accounting for patterns in phenomena, and 
creating hypotheses that verify the link between categories. Moreover, grounded 
theory hypotheses are “constantly revised during the research until they hold true 
for all of the evidence concerning the phenomena under study” (p. 11). This study 
does not delve into the later procedural stages which result in a hypothesis about 
the interrelated conditions that create the conditions for the possibility of a given 
phenomena. However, it does closely follow the rigorous constant-comparative 
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method involved in explicating various functions of dialogue and grouping these 
into broader, more abstract theoretical categories. In the analysis, the reliability 
with which these categories (disturbing, educative, and maintaining) are put 
forward and the manner in which they influence the character and content of 
turning will be clarified. 
 Identifying themes. Drawing on these methodological principles for data 
analysis, the following paragraphs describe the process by which themes were 
constructed in the present study. The first interview was transcribed and 10 
functions of dialogue emerged. These initial themes included: challenging, 
deflecting, intensifying or agitating, inviting, warning, inquiring, explaining, 
redefining relationships, and defending or legitimizing. After transcribing the first 
interview and constructing a list of provisional concepts, the second, third and 
fourth interviews were transcribed. During each transcription, concepts and their 
defining qualities (i.e. defending or legitimizing— dialogue that gave a 
justification for holding to an existing or new moral position) were on hand. Each 
time conversations about moral issues were described, provisional concepts were 
revisited to discern whether or not they sufficiently described the dialogue 
phenomena in each subsequent interview. Many of these provisional concepts 
were solidified in their validity due to the overwhelming presence of instances 
that were explained by them. For example, there were more than 20 experiences 
of dialogue communicated by participants that included the “challenging” 
function of dialogue regarding morality. However, some concepts were added to 
the existing list after finding that it was not sufficient in exhaustively illustrating 
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the occurrence of different forms of dialogue in moral turning points. A case in 
point is the addition of “affirming” dialogue and “co-reflective or processing” 
dialogue. These both indicated a type of dialogue that played a role in facilitating 
or maintaining relationships during turning points but added more specificity to 
the already-existing functions such as: redefining, reinforcing, or defending or 
legitimizing. In other words, these two added functions informed the creation of a 
more abstract category, “maintaining” communication, because they gave a 
clearer picture of how all of these functions of dialogue were serving moral 
turning.   
 The process of thematizing was continued by reducing and integrating 
dialogic functions similar to Luttenberg and Bergen’s process of integrating 
domains of teachers’ reflections on teaching practice (2008, p. 549). In 
transcribing and reflecting on interviews “the categories [began] to emerge from 
this analysis, and names for these categories [began] to emerge” (Fraas & Calvert, 
2009, p. 318). This being the case, dialogic themes were grouped in the following 
taxonomy: disturbing, educative, and maintaining. The subcategory of “inquiring” 
dialogue was originally apart of the “educative” category. However, after the 
enumeration of many examples of dialogue that “inquired,” it was decided that it 
more accurately embodied the “maintaining” function of dialogue. Also, the 
subcategories of “exemplifying” and “deflecting” dialogue were removed because 
they proved to be too ambiguous to support any concrete dialogic feature of the 
three main categories that was not already sufficiently captured by other 
subcategories. The categories of “educative,” “disturbing,” and “maintaining” 
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dialogue, with their various subcategories more firmly in place, seemed to 
sufficiently describe the phenomenological character of dialogue in the remaining 
interviews (Baxter & Babbie, 2004, p. 319).  
 Solidifying themes. Through the process of listening to interviews already 
conducted and conducting new interviews, attention was given to probing, in 
order to see if there were any major dialogic functions not captured by these 
categories. For example, in the last five interviews that were conducted, toward 
the end of the interview participants were often asked: “It seems like you have 
described your conversations as challenging your existing moral framework or 
explaining another concept of moral action… Are there any other characteristics 
of communication in these conversations that you haven’t described?” It was 
found that these categories sufficiently described the types of messages present in 
conversations surrounding moral turning. Another method by which these results 
were corroborated was by member checking. This method served to give 
participants the opportunity to fill in interpretational gaps that may exist in the 
analysis by, “[presenting] them with several sample units of data and [asking] 
them to perform a categorization, determining the extent to which it matches your 
own category” (Baxter & Babbie, 2004, p. 369). Therefore, each participant was 
given the opportunity to review several messages (which they reported in the 
interview) and give feedback as to the accuracy of categorization. This indicated 
that the categories given accurately portrayed the dialogic functions in the self-
reports of turning point events. 
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Chapter Five: Analysis 
 As discussed above, moral reasoning is a process that happens through 
communication, made possible by the conceptual structure of language through 
the relation of ideas. There are various ways in which morality as a concept, and 
the enacting of various concepts, is taught and put into practice in daily life. The 
emphasis of much current research expresses the implicit, deeply rooted nature of 
moral understanding and communication. This may be true in many cases; 
however, the results of this study indicate that engaging in dialogue is a catalyst 
for a more explicit form of moral reasoning. Based on interview data, several key 
functions of dialogue emerged (see table 2). In the following section, each 
dialogic function will be briefly introduced and passages from the interviews will 
be explicated to support the categorization of functions. In this manner, the reader 
will be able to gain a rich understanding of the multi-faceted ways in which the 
dialogic character of communication functions to influence change in beliefs or 
enactments of morality. However, at present this analysis will aim to outline the 
many thematic functions that came into focus during the interview process. 
 Interview data were categorized in the following emergent themes: 
educative, disturbing, and maintaining. Included in dialogue’s “educating” 
function was communication that: inquired, invited, warned, informed, instructed, 
or directed. Conversely, the “disturbing” function of dialogue displayed factors 
that persuaded, challenged, or defended or legitimized. These two dialogic 
functions seemed to be the catalysts for moral turning. In fact, they actually 
appeared to operate as measures of impending moral turning. While some 
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conversations disturbed previous moral conceptions or educated persons about a 
new way to understand morality, the “maintaining” function of dialogue affirmed, 
redefined relationships, inquired about, deflected, or reinforced moral attitudes or 
beliefs that affected the daily requirements for relationship maintenance. The 
“maintaining” function of dialogue created the conceptual space in relationships 
that enabled persons to reflect upon or react to external influences.  
 Although these categories presented distinct communicative features, 
some more apparent than others at times, all of these were connected in producing 
transformation in the participants’ moral perspective. For instance participant B, 
when asked how he would comport himself with his younger “self” regarding the 
topic of morality, said: “Well, I’d be careful what I said to me. Because... I 
wouldn’t wanna just pull the culture rug from under my feet, I don’t believe in 
that.” In his own dialogical approach, he would temper disturbing, unsettling 
communication with communication that would maintain a slow shift and provide 
an educative platform from which to approach morality. In a similar vein, the 
following analysis highlights and explicates various dialogic scenarios, bringing 
out the way in which communication functions in the moral turning of each 
individual. Each function of dialogue is identified and defined. Prominent 
examples explain how dialogue assisted the process of moral turning. 
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Table 2 
Functions of Dialogue 
Function Definition Examples 
Educative  
(Bring Out/Forth) 
 
Dialogue that led out, or 
brought forth a new 
way of understanding, 
not conceived before. 
- Explaining/ 
Informing 
- Inviting 
- Warning 
- Instructing/Directing 
Disturbing 
(Unsettling)  
 
Dialogue that threw into 
disorder. A process of 
turmoil or confusion; 
lacking clarity. 
- Challenging 
- Persuading  
- Intensifying/ 
Agitating 
- Exposing 
Maintaining 
(Hold Together) 
 
Dialogue that holds 
together, keeping or 
supporting something 
through repeated action. 
(Ideological or 
relational) 
- Inquiring 
- Defending/ 
Legitimizing 
- Co-reflecting/ 
Processing 
- Redefining 
relationships 
- Reinforcing/ 
Affirming 
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Dialogue as Educator  
 One of the three categories that emerged from analysis of interviews was 
dialogue that functioned to educate participants about different moral beliefs. This 
theme came to light through messages that had these qualities: participants were 
“led out” of existing modes of thinking in some manner or some new moral 
concept was “brought forth,” creating a new understanding.  In other words, 
dialogue that was coded as “educative” prompted a way of understanding 
morality that was not conceived before. A prominent catalyst in these emerging 
adults’ moral turning points, “educative” dialogue functioned in many ways: to 
explain or inform persons of a given moral conception, invite persons to take part 
in an embodiment of a given moral framework, warn persons of the consequences 
of believing or acting according to a particular moral understanding, and also to 
instruct or direct someone to act according to a specific conceptualization of 
morality. There were no strong associations between dialogic function and 
trajectory of moral turning (i.e. if a participant was challenged in conversation, it 
did not necessarily prompt a one hundred eighty degree behavioral 
transformation). For example, if participants experienced “instructing” 
communication in dialogue, they did not necessarily carry out those 
understandings in behavior following turning points. However, it is clear that 
turning point events were full of dialogue that functioned to educate participants 
about conceptions of morality to which they had not been exposed in childhood or 
adolescence. In this section, examples of “explaining,” “inviting,” “warning,” and 
“instructing” dialogue will be explicated as well as their perceived effect on 
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emerging adults’ moral turning points.  
  
 Explaining or informing. Conversational messages carry meaning or 
information about one’s world that persons want to be able to convey to a 
relational partner. There are many different methods by which meaning can be 
communicated in dialogue from communicating a specific mood through a choice 
in tone to defining terms in the conversation at hand. However differentiated the 
manner in which meaning is translated from one person to another, it is translated 
by way of information that is given. Participants repeatedly gave examples where 
conversations served to explain something about a different moral position that 
the participant had not been familiar with or that served as an opportunity for 
participants to explain their new moral position to existing network members. For 
example, participant D went through several months, following her engagement to 
her romantic partner, explaining to family members that they were not going to 
have a traditional Christian marriage, in the sense that they wanted to make the 
commitment of marriage without making it legal in the traditional sense. In the 
following instance, she related the experience of telling a friend about her 
situation:  
We talked to one friend who I was a little afraid of telling him because his 
dad’s a pastor at a church and he’s going to take over [for him], and he’s 
in my opinion like, you know, traditional Christian... So I was: “I wonder 
how he’s going to interpret this.” So, once we explained it, he said: “You 
know what I think… that’s really great!”  
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In this example, participant D clarified her moral perspective to a close friend. 
This was an important aspect of her turning because the reactions of persons with 
whom she was close became evident instead of remaining a mystery. In terms of 
its explanatory nature, dialogue also offered participants the opportunity to learn 
more about the moral positions of others. In the following scenario, which took 
place at the latter stages of participant D’s adolescence, she described the impact 
of a mentor’s explanation of what it means to love another person: 
My definition of morality as “loving others and yourself” happened 
through a lot of conversations with my partner. And, a lot of it came with 
understanding my Young Life leader in high school... she said: “You 
know, love’s not a feeling. It’s a choice even when you don’t feel it, you 
choose to love another person.” I remember it being just like... My mind 
was blown... that love wasn’t everything I had seen in the movies and it 
was choosing to love other people even when it was hard. It wasn’t even 
like a persuasion. It was more like: “I’ve never even looked at it that way.” 
And the more I experienced the more I thought, “That’s what love is... it’s 
choosing to love someone even when you don’t feel like it.” 
Conversations like these set participant D on a trajectory that inspired deeper 
thought regarding the nature of love. She emphasized that these kinds of 
explanations opened her up to see morality in ways that she did not expect. For 
the most part, examples given by various participants of explanatory dialogue 
revealed that dialogue functioning in this way served to deepen or broaden their 
perspective on a given moral topic. However, explaining did not always have this 
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positive effect in moral turning points. Participant E gave the example of 
explanatory dialogue functioning to excuse his immoral behavior at the beginning 
of his emerging adult experience. He said:  
When I was asked how I made those decisions, I would say: “Well, if it 
fits with my present desires [e.g. drinking, hanging out late, sleeping with 
girls] and it’s not blatantly contradictory to what I believe then…” That’s 
how I managed myself, that’s kind of how I dealt with [morality]. 
In this case, participant E described his attitude whenever confronted with 
thinking about his behavior. Instead of dialogue primarily functioning to elucidate 
and deepen moral understanding, it served to obscure morality and alleviate his 
moral responsibility. Later in the interview, participant E told the interviewer 
about a particular turning point experience that caused him to think differently 
about the explanatory function of dialogue. In this example, he described his 
reaction to a philosophy class that caused him to stop and think more deeply: 
I thought the class was crazy because [the professor] would ask direct 
questions like: “What do you think about the afterlife? What do you think 
the meaning of life is?” I was never accustomed to sharing about those 
things, so I had a negative reaction to it.  
Eventually, however, participant E was impacted by this professor’s commitment 
to drawing out explanations for holding moral positions. Though it did not come 
naturally, participant E’s turning point experiences were characterized by a 
growth in his ability to explain his reasons for understanding morality in the way 
he did.  
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 In these examples, dialogue functioned to explain a moral position or a 
moral position was embodied in an explanation. These explanations served to 
influence participants’ moral turning in both positive and negative ways. Some, 
like participant D, appreciated explanations of others’ moral understanding 
because it supported her growth and change. These conversations were significant 
tuning points for her because they allowed her to expand her moral perspective. 
On the contrary, for persons like participant E, explanatory dialogue was 
sometimes negative because it caused discomfort (causing participant E to give 
explanations that he did not want to give). 
Inviting. Sometimes an invitation can be relatively subtle, but persons 
experience invitations regularly in conversation. Dialogue that functions to 
“invite” requested or elicited particular moral or immoral behaviors. This 
subcategory is conceptualized as a form of “educative” dialogue because it serves 
to introduce a moral position, even if implicitly. There were several prominent 
examples of dialogue that invited participants to think or act in a way that had 
moral implications or content. In the following example, participant B described 
repeated instances in which dialogue functioned to invite youth group members to 
accept Jesus as their savior and repent:  
There was also the culture of youth groups and so you’re hearing 
messages all the time in youth groups. And camps… that was a huge 
thing. There is a progression [in the messages], and what’s harped upon is 
the suffering of Christ and the evilness of sin, and then the message of 
redemption. So, first you are convinced that you’re fallen, that all your life 
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you are lost, a prisoner to sin, a slave to sin. That opens the door for the 
message of redemption where you’re invited to accept Jesus as your 
savior. But, if you’re not “lost,” if you’re not miserable, if you’re not a 
horrible sinner, it’s less inviting to be set free... I heard that message 
multiple times a week for my whole life. 
These opportunities, created by invitational rhetoric, were interesting expressions 
of moral negotiation. The invitation was educative in the sense that it was 
accompanied by messages that communicated explicitly moral content. However, 
the invitational component of “camp dialogue” was subtler. This kind of 
invitation had an adverse effect on participant B because he thought it was a 
manipulative way to introduce morality. These experiences were catalysts for his 
moral turning because they pushed him further away from ideologies that 
expressed themselves in a like manner.  
 Dialogue functioning to invite was not always received negatively. For 
participant H, it was “inviting” dialogue that was the focus of one memorable 
turning point event. During her first years in college, she was exposed to religion 
in a way that she hadn’t been in Germany, where she grew up. She learned a lot 
about Christianity through the lives of persons with whom she lived, in Georgia. 
However, she told the interviewer that she never was able to formulate a 
thoughtful opinion about belief in God because she didn’t “know a lot.” That 
changed when she was invited to read a book by her college professor:  
I ended up talking to him in his office and I saw this book on the shelf. I 
was like: “Ah, that’s the book that you wrote!” And he was like: “Ya! Do 
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you want to read it?” And I was like: “Sure, I’m going to Germany next 
week... I’m going to read it on the plane. 
This invitational rhetoric allowed participant H to discover more about a unique 
moral position without directly engaging in dialogue about the moral position in 
person.  
 Another case that communicates this particular function of dialogue was 
seen in an experience recounted by participant C. When he went to college, he 
had his first experience drinking alcohol. He was raised in a Christian family and 
drinking alcohol was prohibited. However, when he got to college he had a 
roommate who drank. In the interview, participant C was asked if he had any 
conversations with his roommate about whether or not he thought drinking was 
wrong. He said that no such conversations took place; he was merely invited to 
take part. This was described as a memorable turning point for participant C and 
he relayed the important thusly:  
I wasn’t told... there wasn’t a construct where that was bad, because no 
one was there to... I mean, I guess there were the RAs who told us not to 
drink in the room, but we didn’t. We drank other places.  
These instances exemplify dialogue that functions to invite emerging adults to 
experience morality from a different perspective without being forced or 
explicitly persuaded. In this way, invitational rhetoric for participants in this study 
was educative because, through dialogue, they were brought into an expression of 
morality that differed from their previous conceptions.  
 Warning. In some cases, conversations are an opportunity for one person 
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to warn another to not perform or take part in a behavior that is perceived to be 
immoral. According to the data, it was apparent that warning someone did not 
always have the desired effect but, nevertheless, it was often an impetus for moral 
turning point events. For example, Participant B recalled from an early age, 
examples of his mother warning him about being transparent, loving, and close as 
a family. Moreover, he recounted a specific domain that continually came up in 
dialogue with his mom when he was still very young. He remembered: 
[My mother] would never lie to me and she would expect me to never to 
lie to her... She would constantly say it. You know, for instance she told 
me about Santa Claus. She said she didn’t want me to ever hear a lie from 
her and she didn’t want me to ever lie to her.  
These conversations in which he was warned about the consequences of lying 
stayed with him throughout his emerging adult experience. Further in his 
reflections on this matter, participant B clarifies his interpretation of such events: 
From as young as I can remember the rhetoric was surrounding love and 
closeness and openness and um, and it’s very, um... and again, not in a 
negative sense, but very clinging and controlling.  
In both of these utterances, participant B is giving examples of dialogue used as a 
type of warning. Warnings in the conversations recalled by participants 
functioned to explicitly communicate expectations of given moral positions. The 
mother of participant B used early conversations to warn him about the negativity 
of lying by reinforcing the gravity of doing so. He reiterated, moral messages 
were always framed as a warning or communication that was expressed “because 
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[his mother] loved him and [wanted him] to be righteous and live a good life.”  
 Ironically, for most of the participants who experienced dialogue in which 
others warned them of a particular embodiment of morality, it had the effect of 
driving them closer to the acts about which they were being warned. For example, 
in her early twenties participant F stopped attending her parents’ church. She had 
already experienced several moral turning points that led her away from 
Christianity as a significant moral compass for her life. Though she had stopped 
regularly attending worship services, she still went on some occasions. On these 
occasions, she engaged in conversations that consisted of others warning her of 
the danger inherent in her not going to church. She said in the interview: “Some 
of the older people that I respected would come and ask me, like: ‘Are you not 
afraid for your salvation?’ It just... It pushed me so far from them.” In this 
instance the intended, explicit function of dialogue was to warn. Instead of 
“correcting” perceived immoral behavior, these communications caused 
participants to react in opposition.  
 For participant G, “warning” dialogue had a similar effect at first, but 
influenced his eventual turning in a positive way. He explained that, in the 
conversations he had with his parents during many turning point events in 
emerging adulthood (these conversations were fewer for this participant than 
others), warning him about immoral behavior spurred him on like participants B 
and F. He gave the following conversation with his dad as an example: 
There were lots of times that they talked to me about drinking. They talked 
to me about smoking and stuff. Um, Dad would have said: “I’ve seen the 
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results of this kind of living. It’s not good, smoking will kill you, you 
know, I’ve seen alcoholics from church...” Told me that’s not where I 
want to be. 
Though he did not heed his father’s warning at the time, he eventually came to see 
the wisdom in his father’s insight. This example of “warning” dialogue is 
especially interesting in participant G’s journey of moral turning because he 
described his turning as a reorientation in the way he saw his relationship with 
God. His parents had raised him according to their conception of Christian 
morality but, from that conception of morality, he rebelled. He characterized his 
moral turning “point” as a slow process of coming to see Christianity in his own, 
new way. Dialogue that functioned to warn these emerging adults was categorized 
as “educative” dialogue because it was representative of communication that 
aimed to shed light on the consequences of perceived immoral behavior. 
 Instructing or directing. Especially found in the early experiences of 
many participants, dialogue was used in an instructive or directive manner. 
Conversations that exemplified these qualities included messages that were 
informational, yet with the express purpose of directing the hearer to adopt a 
certain line of action in accordance with the communicated moral belief. 
Participant B discerned this kind of directive communication in conversations 
early in his life and he even followed the same pattern of dialogue when speaking 
with his siblings. He explained: 
One of my siblings, I was really close to and I would just... sort of... I 
don’t know, I would admonish him, try to tell him how to be... why, you 
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know, why what he was doing was wrong and what the right path would 
be and that sort of thing. So, I was extension of that, um, the machinery... 
the disciplinary machinery. 
In this passage, participant B was using dialogue as a means of transmitting a 
particular moral position by making use of a directive form of communication in 
which information was coupled with an implicit desire to see his brother follow 
suite. Another example of “instructing” dialogue in early childhood was seen in 
participant I’s experience. He communicated this dialogic function in the 
following memory: 
We were at a department store and I picked up a candy... I ripped open the 
bar and started eating. She [my mom] was like: “You cannot do that!” And 
I was like: “Why?” “Well, it’s not right because we have to pay for it 
first... Then, it becomes yours and you can eat it.” 
Interestingly, in many of participant I’s emerging adult turning points dialogue 
functioned very differently. During childhood, he was moral discussion came in 
the form of instruction or direction. In emerging adulthood, when he came across 
persons who did not behave in a way that followed the principles to which he was 
committed, he adapted his definition of morality to include those behaviors 
instead of directing them to act differently. In other words, he experienced 
dialogue that functioned to instruct (when he was a child) but never enacted this 
form of moral rhetoric. On the other hand, participant F did enact the instructive 
or directive form of dialogue when engaging her nieces and nephews in 
conversations about morality: 
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[My nieces and nephews] will ask me, like what do I think about this and 
that. I was excited and I could tell them and they were open. And they’re 
not scared to really disagree with me cause I’m not gonna... I’m not gonna 
yell at them or anything like that. So I actually kind of have fun when they 
disagree with me cause I can kinda deconstruct what they think and show 
them... and not that I’m... I always tell them that I could be wrong. But I 
tell them: “This is why I think that.” And the main thing that I tell em to 
always, whatever they believe, that they have to actually think about it and 
not just believe it. 
This example of participant F instructing her nieces and nephews to always think 
about why they believe what they believe was directly related to her process of 
moral turning during that time. She found that she could use dialogue to instruct 
her nieces and nephews in order to help them avoid what she understood to be the 
negative elements of the moral framework in which she was raised. In all of the 
cases, regardless of the influence of dialogue on participants’ trajectories in moral 
turning, messages in dialogue functioned to instruct or direct behavior in the hope 
of aligned behavior with a particular understanding of morality. 
Dialogue as Disturber 
 The second category that emerged was dialogue as “disturber.” The theme 
of disturbance, as included in Table 2, connotes something that is thrown into 
disorder, a process of turmoil, lack of clarity, or confusion. In this way dialogue 
pointedly incited participants to re-examine their existing moral framework. 
Dialogue functioned to disturb moral understanding and, therefore, induce moral 
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turning in several ways, including: directly challenging an existing way of 
thinking about morality, persuading persons to consider an alternative moral 
conception, intensifying or agitating existing negative feelings about a particular 
moral ideology, or exposing a perceived flaw in a moral position. Although it 
functioned to bring about change differently than the “educative” function, the 
“disturbing” function of dialogue was also a significant catalyst for moral turning 
point events. In this section, examples of “challenging,” “persuading,” 
“intensifying or agitating,” and “exposing” dialogue will be explicated as well as 
their perceived affect on emerging adults’ moral turning points. 
 Challenging. Sometimes the mood accompanying the process of moral 
turning points is marked by conflict, disillusionment, or disagreement with one’s 
existing conception of morality. Several examples from the data highlight the 
experience of challenging or confronting existing ways of understanding morality. 
For person A this meant asking, why? “Why do I have to believe in God in order 
to be a moral person?” Although, in this example, person A directly challenged 
his parents, friends, and teachers in conversation on a regular basis, confrontation 
or challenging was not always so explicit. Case and point, Person E regarded with 
some amount of detached calm, his process of moral turning in its early stages:  
I just stopped drinking because I got bored of it and it was meaningless. 
Growing up, my parents didn’t have an opinion about how I spent my 
time. For them, it was always about happiness. As long as I was happy... I 
started to question this, because I was told “that, in order for something to 
be moral, it needed an end or a purpose.” 
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In this way Person E shows how his parents’ conception of life is left wanting. 
There are many ways that participants described challenging or confronting 
existing beliefs but the central theme of “disturbing” dialogue, regardless of how 
content of moral beliefs changed, was to delve deeper and find some sort of 
foundation on which to build a moral system. For example, participant B had 
several encounters in the early years of emerging adulthood with girls who 
claimed that God wanted them to be with him romantically. In the following 
passage, participant B talked about how he confronted this idea as a part of his 
moral turning that consisted of turning away from defining morality in Christian 
terms: 
And I remember saying, you know: “That’s just what you want. You’re 
rationalizing what you want and, um, putting God in the picture, but you 
know how I know that that’s not what God told you? Because there’s no 
way in hell that I would ever date you.” 
Accordingly, participant B took advantage of the opportunity afforded by this 
conversation to explicitly challenge a conceptual pillar of the Christianity from 
which he was turning. In a similar manner, participant C experienced several 
impacting turning point events in his emerging adult experience that assisted or 
informed his transition from an “institutionalized view of morality to a de-
institutionalized view of morality.” This turning was instigated by his relationship 
with a pastor that was fired from the church he attended. Participant C described 
how his pastor or mentor was different in his conception of morality than his 
parents or the church in which he grew up: 
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I think what was even more eye opening... was the fact that he indicated 
that that the institution was never a part of his moral code. That, this moral 
code first and then he chose to be a part of this institution second. And, 
frankly that was a new idea for me. You know... I was raised in a place 
where the institution was primary and what you learned was secondary. 
So, I’ve kind of taken that to heart and that’s why I see that the institution 
[of religion] is not really necessary. 
In this example, the challenge came in a subtler way. Participant C described this 
particular experience as a pivotal turning point because it turned his existing 
“order” of morality around. In this new conception, he decided that it was 
morality that informed the action of the church and not the other way around. This 
challenge was the beginning of participant C’s turning. This eventually brought 
him to drastically downplay the role of any institution in the genesis or 
enforcement of a specific or rigid set of rules by which to live. This example also 
neatly characterized the central quality of “challenging” dialogue. Dialogue in 
these emerging adults’ moral turning often served to contest the validity, 
complexity, authenticity, or agreeability of their existing moral frameworks. 
However, this was not always a clean transition. Often, the system of morality 
with which others challenged the participants’ moral positions were, themselves, 
challenged by participants. More distinctly than the educative function of 
dialogue, this “challenging” kind of disturbing rhetoric was the momentum for 
change in these emerging adults’ lives. 
 Persuading. Another form of “disturbing” dialogue, persuasion was a 
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prominent them in reorienting the way these emerging adults understood morality. 
Persuasion is under the category as dialogue that disturbed because it had a 
similar unsettling effect; persons were explicitly called to stop and examine what 
they believed about morality. However, persuasive rhetoric was different in its 
tone than challenging rhetoric. According to the data, persuasion was more of a 
sustained effort to convince another, as opposed to the more aggressive or abrupt 
nature of a challenge. In the following example, participant F described the tactics 
by which her mom tried to get her to follows the rules of the house and the rules 
of Christianity. She had stayed out with some of her college friends late one night 
and she when she came home her mom tried to persuade her to stop doing those 
“immoral” things: 
My mom would wait in my room, crying. When I would get home, she 
would yell at me. She would hit me. Sometimes, cry… sometimes beg me 
to come to church. She kind of used different approaches but all of them 
were really irrational, you know, always just yelling, crying, screaming… 
whatever it was, you know? 
Although it may not be conceived as “good” dialogue, it was a way in which 
participant F’s mother tried to communicate a moral position through 
conversation. In the next example, participant G described the kind of dialogue 
that he would have with friends while he was in his rebellious young emerging 
years. He still had a group of Christian friends, but started to build more 
friendships that were centered on “seeking pleasure.” When asked about the types 
of conversations he had with his friends at that time in his life, he described 
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conversations that were void of much depth (self reported); conversations that 
were spent persuading his existing friends to just have fun: 
Um, well... He, he was kinda like... We kinda talked him into to doing 
what we wanted to do. So, like: “Hey! Come on, let’s go drink or 
something.” And there were times like, uh... We’d do stuff like that or 
we’d do stuff we weren’t supposed to do and we could kinda get him to do 
that. All our parents found out at different times and his parents didn’t like 
us because of that. 
In this example, the intended function of dialogue was to persuade his friends to 
not challenge his enactment of a new moral understanding. In other words, at this 
point in his life he was tired of “trying to live up to the high moral standards of 
Christianity” and he, instead thought it right to seek pleasure and have fun. 
Dialogue did not function to challenge his beliefs. It instead functioned to 
persuade others to join him in his turning and not examine the decisions being 
made. This case of dialogue functioning to persuade others in participant G’s 
network was an unusual example of the presence of persuasive rhetoric. Usually, 
the persuasive rhetoric functioned to motivate change in the participants 
themselves. For example, in the following instance, participant I described a time 
when he and a friend were riding motorcycles in India. When they stopped to get 
gas at a station, the attendant came out to fill the tank and when he went back 
inside to get the ticket with the amount to be paid the friend sped off. Participant I 
described why this was an influential turning point for him: 
When we drove away I yelled at him, like: “What the hell? We can’t do 
  
 
94 
this!” And he was like: “What’s wrong? Haven’t you done this before?” 
And that was like the instigating aspect for me... I was like: “You guys 
have done this before?” And he said, “Ya! It’s fine. It happens all the 
time.” So, I again... I felt like I was not part of a set of people who found 
this to be cool. Similarly, with the girl he was like: “Come on, we’ve 
always done this. It happens all the time.” I was like, “Well, I’ve never 
done this.” And he said, “There’s a first time for everything.” 
In this experience, his friend used this dialogic opportunity to persuade him that, 
sometimes, stealing was okay. In fact (he continued), it happened all the time and 
he tried to reassure participant I that this understanding of morality was enacted 
all of the time. Along this vein, persuasive rhetoric was a mixture of invitation 
and challenge. It was educative in a sense, but directly and verbally invited 
persons to understand morality in a different manner. Thematically, persuasive 
rhetoric was distinguishable because it was characterized by the effort on the part 
of others to try and get these emerging adults to understand morality differently 
by giving reasons; not merely an invitation to enact morality in a particular way 
and also not directly challenging their existing moral perception. In most cases, it 
was successful and brought about change in the way that these emerging adults 
conceptualized morality. This seemed to be because most of the participants did 
not feel like they were given reasons in childhood for the adopting of their 
“familial” morality. So, for these emerging adults, the very act of giving reasons 
to support a moral argument was unique and transformational. This function of 
dialogue, as seen in previous functions, also did not have the power to predict the 
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content of moral turning. It merely ignited the desire for change from existing 
understandings or perceptions (“norms”) of morality.  
 Intensifying or agitating. Unlike dialogue that operated to challenge or 
persuade, rhetoric that intensified or agitated participants caused them some 
amount of confusion regarding moral understanding without the same 
intentionality that came with these other functions of dialogue. Motivations or 
intentions were expressly present in the challenging and persuading rhetoric of 
communicators. The following example uncovers a situation in which the 
communicator was not necessarily trying to disturb participant A’s moral position 
but, nevertheless, dialogue with this person agitated participant A’s understanding 
of morality. He remembered: 
My stepdad influenced how I thought about morality in the sense that I 
liked to argue with him. He was very traditional, he agreed... He never 
made any absolute claims about anything... He just said: “You don’t do 
that... you just shouldn’t do that.” That’s as far as he would go... That 
perpetuated my frustration with tradition and seeking out morality because 
that didn’t seem sufficient.  
Often, like in this example, the intensifying or agitating nature of turning point 
conversations was not an intended outcome of dialogue on the part of the 
communicator. Participant A’s stepdad did not likely expressly try to agitate him 
by embodying in dialogue what participant A had grown to dislike so much. 
However, by engaging in such dialogue, his reasons for wanting to change his 
concept of morality were intensified.  
  
 
96 
 The example above of participant F’s mom crying and yelling at her is a 
case where 1) dialogue is understood as having many functions working together 
simultaneously, and 2) dialogue is creating a situation in which the experience of 
turning is intensified. In this example, we can see how her mom’s communication 
style in this dialogue caused an increased adverse reaction to her parents’ morality 
during emerging adulthood. In the subsequent example, participant F described a 
situation in which dialogue that functioned to intensify her frustrations with 
Christians. In this situation, her plans to go to California with friends were foiled 
by their dad at the last moment. Regarding her frustration, she said: 
I found out from the dad, he said... He got on the phone and told me that 
he had never really planned on letting us go anyway, in his mind, and yet 
he told us that... and I was like “Why did you lead us on?” And he was 
like, “Well, I never really intended for you guys to go... I just didn’t want 
to let you down.” 
His explanation was frustrating to her, because she perceived this to be another 
example of the lack of integrity or morality in the Christian community in which 
she grew up. In this dialogue, the dad’s explanation did not have explicit moral 
content but was an embodiment of the morality from which participant F was 
turning away during emerging adulthood that agitated her and moved her further 
away from identifying with Christian morality. All of these examples reveal how 
dialogue can function to intensify an existing experience of moral turning. This 
kind of intensification was a salient theme for many participants because it 
perpetuated their feelings of being unsettled or in a state of confusion regarding 
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what they thought about morality during emerging adulthood.  
 Exposing. In several cases, that data revealed experiences of dialogue that 
functioned to expose an opinion, concern, or value related to an existing or new 
moral understanding. For example, when participant F was 21, she was at a family 
party when the issue of drinking alcohol came up. She took the opportunity to 
expose her feelings or moral position at the party: 
I was at my parents’ house and somebody said: “Where’s the booze?” My 
nephew said it. He’s really young and he said it as a joke. And then his 
mom kind of like, smacked his mouth. And then I was like, “Well, what 
would be so bad about celebrating with alcohol?” And she was like, “Are 
you crazy?” And then I said what I thought and she said to not say that 
stuff around her kids.  
In this instance, dialogue functioned to expose a moral understanding that was not 
previously held by others in the conversation: this was met by admonishment by 
her aunt. This dialogic occurrence was categorized as different from  “explaining” 
because of the way in which the explanation uncovered what lay hidden and the 
disturbance it caused. In a similar manner, though the tone was not as challenging 
or negative, participant H engaged in dialogue with a group of Americans at the 
beginning of her emerging adult experience. This took place at a sports camp in 
Germany and functioned to expose participant H to Christianity (a conception of 
morality with which she was not familiar): 
There was a group from America who, they were in Germany and they 
were musicians. And, they were just interested in sports so they came to 
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that event as well. But, they were Americans. And, you know, they started 
to talk about why they were in Germany, they were on a mission...and 
they played music for God so that was the first time that I had met a group 
of people that all believed. And, so I started, like I’m very open minded, 
it’s not like I had shut this out but before I was just never around 
[Christian] people so it just never came up.  
In this experience, participant H was exposed to belief in God in a way that she 
had never been before. Dialogue functioning in this way was an important aspect 
of participants’ turning points because it uncovered an aspect of morality that was 
previously covered over. Participant H, during her childhood, had had extensive 
training from her parents and in school to “[do] the right thing in [her] daily 
decisions,” to not “harm people with them… don’t cheat, don’t steal, don’t lie.” 
However she had not been exposed to people who define moral actions as a part 
of their religious participation. Because she had not grown up around religion, the 
experience of talking to someone from another country and uncovering moral 
understanding from a religious framework was a pivotal event for her.  
Dialogue as Maintainer  
 This third emergent theme carries the notion of holding something 
together, a kind of keeping or supporting something through a habitual practicing. 
Upon analysis, this theme pertained to relationship maintaining as well as 
ideological maintaining in that participants used dialogue to facilitate or manage 
their relationships as their moral understanding changed, or visa versa. This was 
significant in emerging adults’ experience of moral turning: while the “educating” 
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and “disturbing” functions of dialogue acted as the catalyst for change or turning, 
“maintaining” dialogue functioned as a practical means by which participants 
continually reassessed, redefined, and held together a meaningful interpretation of 
their experience. This category of dialogic function most closely resembled 
communication as negotiation. In other words, it was through the process of 
negotiation taking place in “maintaining” dialogue that participants were able to 
manage the opposing discourses or tensions in different conceptions of morality. 
Salient themes of “maintaining” dialogue that emerged from the data were 
messages in conversation that: inquired about the unique aspects of a different 
moral framework, provided a defense for or legitimized a particular line of moral 
thinking, gave participants the opportunity to reflect on moral change with 
relational counterparts, affirmed the process of growth or change in participants’ 
emerging adult experience, defined morality a new way or redefined one’s 
existing conception of morality, or reinforced particular messages or implications 
of a new or existing moral understanding.  
 Inquiring. For many of the participants, early emerging adult 
conversations that served to challenge their existing understanding or educate 
them about other moral conceptions caused them to raise questions in an attempt 
to bring the new conception of morality to their existing understanding. Inquiry, 
in dialogue, was marked by an attitude of seeking knowledge through asking 
questions of persons who were perceived to have a level of wisdom beyond that 
of the inquirer (e.g. teachers, older siblings, parents, etc.). Consequently, the 
“inquiring” function of dialogue was categorized as “maintaining” because 
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questioning functioned to facilitate growth in understanding by bringing together 
new and existing conceptions of morality through increased understanding of the 
ways in which they intersected or differed. Following her exposure to Christianity 
by the Americans who visited the sports camp in Germany, participant H 
expresses this function of dialogue, aiming to make sense of the world by 
inquiring further into the nature of the missionaries’ motivations for coming to 
Germany: 
I asked them why they were doing this, like: “Why do you go to Germany 
on a mission?” Like, it didn’t make sense to me. And they just said that 
they wanted to promote happiness and they find a real peacefulness in 
music and they played for me too, and it was no hard rock or nothing. I 
don’t remember exact quotes but they used words like “happiness” and 
“peace”... calming words to go out on the mission. They didn’t convert me 
but it was the first time that I was like, “hmm... that sounds interesting, 
like something I might want to know more about.” 
Following her exposure to a Christian conception of morality, participant H 
seemed to be trying to hold together her worldview in some capacity by asking 
questions that helped her “make sense.” She wanted to clarify what this meant for 
her life in practical terms. This was common in moral turning points. Participants 
needed to be able to bring new interpretations of morality “up against” existing 
ones through questioning and clarifying in order to grow or move forward.  
 Participant J also experienced this kind of dialogue in her conversation 
with an Indian woman while in Egypt. This took place at the end of her emerging 
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adult experience and her formation of a moral framework was stronger at this 
point. However, she still engaged in dialogue and inquired as to how others made 
sense of morality. She explained how she asked her acquaintance about the caste 
system in India because she was trying to make sense of how morality and 
obeying authority were compatible (or if they were compatible): 
I spoke later with an Indian woman, and I asked her... cause you know 
they have a caste system there, and you know: “How do you... what’s your 
life like? Do you have a husband? Do you only do what he says?” You 
know? Like: “Can you move across the caste system?” sort of thing... and, 
I have a lot of Indian friends at school so... we talk about this a lot. And, it 
has to do with that whole freedom of thought, freedom of movement, 
freedom of practice, freedom of ability to do whatever you want. So, that 
was the mentality... which, to me is right. And so then when I see 
situations where that’s not happening, I want to say: “Oh, that’s wrong.” 
But, I want to know why it’s happening. 
For participant J, this inquiring served to solidify her ideas about freedom of 
religion and thought by conceptually “holding up” these new understandings 
against her existing framework. She had grown up with a particular worldview 
and a set of morals that accompanied her religious worldview, but she also 
thought that it was imperative that people be able to choose for themselves. By 
asking questions of the Indian woman, participant J was able to see how morality 
in other parts of the world compared to the morality that had been shaping her 
throughout emerging adulthood. This last sentence of the passage, “But, I want to 
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know why it’s happening,” is a key characteristic in understanding the role of 
inquiring dialogue during emerging adults’ experience of moral turning. It was 
important for participants to not only change their actions in accordance with their 
new moral understanding, but also understand why it was “better” for them to act 
or think differently by constantly readdressing old and new moral positions 
through inquiry.  
 Providing a defense or legitimizing. In the communication of morality, 
often participants were forced to give reasons for why they held a particular moral 
position or they called others to do more work in explaining their reasons for 
conceiving of right and wrong in a particular manner. When this happened, 
dialogue served as a way for persons to provide an apologetic of sorts for why 
they believed what they believed. Persons were called upon to provide a defense. 
In many ways, legitimizing rhetoric looked similar to explanatory rhetoric. 
However, there was one important difference that made examples of legitimizing 
rhetoric distinctly different: dialogic messages that functioned to legitimize did 
more than explain a moral position. The explaining was loaded with the desire for 
conversational partners to recognize participants’ understanding as a possible way 
of applying their existing morality. For participants, legitimizing was distinct 
from explaining because there was a desire for their moral turning or transition to 
be acceptable to their relational network. Sometimes, situations seemed to 
inherently elicit an explanation of the reasons behind actions. Participant B 
remembered his mother giving the following defense or legitimization for why 
she implemented corporeal punishment: 
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I would sometimes receive spankings and my mom would always sit me 
down... and she would be teary-eyed and upset... and she would say: ‘I just 
want you to know that this is because I really love you so much, and I 
would never hurt you but I have to do this to make yo--, to train you’- or 
whatever, but she would give me this long speech every single time. 
In this manner, the participant’s mother used dialogue as a means of explaining 
the reasons for her actions, an apology for the moral rightness of the behavior. 
Often, in situations where the legitimacy of moral positions is called into 
question, dialogue is used to defend or legitimize a moral stance. Conversations 
created a space whereby persons were able to give reasons for why they behaved 
a particular way. The space created by dialogue, however, did not always have the 
same structure or setting. In the previous example, a mother defended or gave a 
legitimizing apology for her style of punishment or instruction. In the following 
passage, participant F described a defense of a very different kind. Far from a 
one-to-one interpersonal exchange, she was engaged in providing intellectual 
support for her religious background in a college classroom:  
I took philosophy and it was kind of anti-religious and I was so angry in 
that class. I had to, kind of, grow out of my shell to think of ways to 
respond to the professors or the other students in that class. And then later 
I was on the other side of the spectrum really.  
This manner of dialogue showed itself as an experience of defending her 
childhood morality. Also, this was an example of a turning point in moral 
thinking that began by inciting the participant to adopt a more complex dialogical 
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approach to defending her parents’ religious framework. This, as the participant 
communicated, led to a more meticulous building of thinking skills and the ability 
to construct deeper understanding. Respectively, through this kind of dialogue she 
managed to form more persuasive arguments that eventually supported her actual 
turning to a non-religious moral position. 
 Another example in which legitimizing was seen as distinct from 
explaining was when participant D and her fiancé tried to legitimize their view of 
marriage to family members. For her these experiences of moral turning were 
very difficult because it seemed nearly impossible to hold together their new 
understanding of marriage and their existing Christian values (at least as they 
were interpreted by network members): 
When we went home to tell our parents, you know I told my mom, “My 
boyfriend gave me this ring and it means this... and he’s committing to me 
forever--” And she’s like: “Well, what does that mean? Are you 
engaged?!” And I’m like, “Well, not really?... I guess-- No, not really, 
because he’s committing to me now, not promising to commit to me 
later.” And so she couldn’t deal with that kind of “wishy-washy” sense of 
what we were... we knew what we were, but we couldn’t express that to 
other people because we hadn’t negotiated what commitment looks like 
[with them]. 
The main component of dialogic legitimization about which participants seems to 
be cognizant was the investment in trying to bring together similar parts of 
differing moral frameworks to form a basis for moral action in emerging 
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adulthood. This proved to be exceedingly difficult because the manner in which 
moral frameworks were often interpreted did not leave room for altered 
applications; thus the effort in legitimizing.  
 Co-reflective or processing. Another noteworthy form of “maintaining” 
dialogue was one that allowed emerging adults to discuss and examine the 
changes, occurring during this time in life, together with others also going through 
pivotal turning points. This theme of dialogue was expressed in many of the 
participants’ self-reported conversations and was distinct from other forms of 
“maintaining” dialogue because it was a negotiation enacted with others perceived 
to be going through similar transition. For example, participant F needed to be 
able to make sense of her experience with her mom. She processed through the 
situation with one of her friends after some of the difficult conversations that took 
place between her and her mom. She related one time in particular when she went 
to a friend’s house after listening to one of her mom’s tirades: 
It was to help me process, you know. If I was to come home and my mom 
was in my room yelling at me, sometimes I would even just leave. I would 
storm out and I would go to my friend’s house and cry and tell her what 
happened... and sleep there, you know?  
Often, as is expressed in this situation, turning point events were overwhelming 
for the participants in this study. They needed to have times of relief in which 
they could “slow down” the process of sense making because they experienced a 
kind of transitional overload.  
 This same participant recalled another instance in which she and her 
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boyfriend took time to process through the change in their relationship. The 
behaviors that were present in their relationship went against the morality of her 
youth and her boyfriend, being aware of this difference, asked her how she felt 
about it: “When we first actually, um... became intimate I was asked: ‘Do you feel 
guilty?’ And I said ‘No…’ but I actually did. The person that I was intimate with, 
my boyfriend [asked me].” This is another case in which dialogue functions to 
maintain or hold together some semblance of moral meaning. The meanings were 
new to participant F, so their validity was negotiated in dialogue with her 
boyfriend. Contrarily, sometimes the co-reflective rhetoric arises between persons 
who are not in the same turning point process; not on the same trajectory of 
turning. For example, participant H remembered a time when she was at a funeral 
and the preacher said something that she did not expect, with which she did not 
agree. As part of her moral turning throughout emerging adulthood, she struggled 
to try to understand what it meant to believe in God. This process was continued 
in a conversation with her co-worker after the funeral: 
I talked to a co-worker about it and she’s a total atheist, so she was like: 
“See?! It makes no sense!” You know? I said: “I just can’t believe that he 
would say that you could be a bad person and still go to heaven.” And, 
still to this point it doesn’t make sense to me. And she just, like, supported 
the fact, she was like: “Ya, that’s why I don’t believe, cause it doesn’t 
make any sense”... So, it was kind of like restating the fact of why she 
doesn’t believe. 
In this way, participant H was able to engage in a conversation with someone who 
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helped her process through change she was experiencing without having to 
necessarily be a part of the same turning point. In all of these cases where 
dialogue functioned to create a space for reflection and the processing of moral 
information, participants were able to bring together or connect seemingly 
disparate moralities, helping them to make sense of their own turning points. The 
central theme of co-reflective rhetoric was the quality of examining the content 
and implications or applications of a given moral position or framework with 
another person in conversation. 
 Redefining relationships as a consequence of new moral 
understanding. Redefining different aspects of participants’ experience, what 
held relationships together, what counted as moral behavior, were all important 
considerations to these emerging adults working through turning point events and 
the implications of such events on their daily lives. Participant A shared one 
example of an idea that went through a constant redefining process. For him, 
defining marriage was a difficult task because he had experienced such 
inconsistency in this area during childhood. However, he participated in dialogue 
when he was in the navy that raised the question of how he was going to think 
about marriage. After being able to talk to his sea mates about marriage and 
observe their infidelity he came to the following conclusion: 
My mom’s on her third husband and my dad’s on his sixth wife. So, going 
through that and then tying it in with these guys on the boat not keeping 
their vows when we tie into port somewhere and they are cheating on their 
wives... things like that and just witnessing that... my ethical view of 
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marriage was, it’s a joke anyway. It doesn’t matter. It doesn’t mean 
anything. 
Through conversations of this nature, participant A was able to process what he 
thought about marriage over a long period of time; at that point constantly adding 
cynicism to his definition of marriage. Later, through conversations with 
Christians, he defined marriage in relation to his conception of God and not based 
on the experience of his sea mates and his parents.  
 Likewise, for participant J, being in an international business school and 
meeting people from around the world constantly brought her to a place of 
redefining what moral actions look like for persons with different belief systems. 
According to participant J, redefining is inevitable because one element of moral 
turning points in emerging adulthood is trying to make sense of how relationships 
shift as a result. She told the interviewer about seeing her friend who, in high 
school, had “turned from straight to gay”: 
Two years later, I saw him... he was working in a paper store or 
something. I saw him and I was like: “Hey how are you?” And he had 
said: “Oh, I just got an apartment with my boyfriend...” And all this kind 
of stuff. So, inadvertently, I learned more information about him but he 
was happy and open, but not necessarily as open as he had been way back 
before. And, that was one thing... I felt like I lost a friend at that point. 
And, I don’t know if it was me or if it was him.  
This passage highlights how relationships were redefined as a result of participant 
J’s moral turning. She solidified in her own religious foundation while realizing 
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how her new understanding changed the manner in which she related with others. 
Participant J differentiated this awareness with the implicit, immediate tolerance 
that she embodied when she was younger.  
Sometimes, there was a note of humor in the process of redefining 
morality. Upon running into a high school peer, participant D shared how she had 
to clarify what she thought was immoral about a particular incident that took 
place in high school. In this experience, participant D went to her mentor and 
complained about her peer’s underage drinking, as it was affecting their perceived 
integrity as leaders of a club on campus. This person apparently had the 
impression that participant D thought drinking was issue. However, participant D 
had to redefine or clarify what she actually thought was immoral:  
I recently saw one of those guys... and he came in when I was eating or 
drinking, whatever, the Jell-o shot, and he goes: “What? What are you 
doing?!... You’re Young Life girl! Blah, blah, blah...” And I was like: “I 
am 24 years old. Are you for real, stuck in high school and you think...” 
And it was just this… “[You] don’t get it” type of thing.... it was the 
hypocrisy that bothered me, not the drinking.  
This experience exemplifies the necessity and regularity of defining and 
redefining in moral turning points. The ways in which these participants made 
sense of the world were changing in distinct ways that affected their daily 
behavior. Often, this led to the unmet or shattered expectations of relational 
counterparts. Thus, participants were called on to communicate the difference in 
belief or behavior. This can be conceptualized as an ongoing work that is being 
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done by emerging adults and points to the negotiated nature of morality in 
relationships.  
 Reinforcing or affirming. Another function of dialogue was the 
reinforcement of feelings (negative and positive) that participants experienced 
when confronted with a new or existing conception of morality. Conversation was 
experienced as a means by which participants negotiated their way through the 
process of moral turning. Dialogue functioning to “reinforce” or “affirm” 
supported the idea that moral turning points are not experienced alone. They are 
transitions that are experienced with other persons in a community. In some cases, 
this meant that phrases, reflecting the “newly conceived morality,” were repeated 
in a manner that continually re-framed and re-interpreted relations of moral ideas. 
For example, when participant I was trying to work through what it meant to be a 
moral businessperson at age 21, he remembered his boss reinforcing his thought 
process. Participant I was in management and, in his employee reviews, he could 
not help but take into account the personal information he knew when he was 
assessing co-workers’ performance. In other words, he felt like it was okay to 
show compassion and not give someone a negative evaluation if he knew they had 
a family to support or other extenuating circumstances. He recounted his boss’s 
response: 
There was one time that my boss questioned me about this and he said: 
“It’s perfectly alright for you to do that.” In the beginning when I was 
guilty, saying I was doing the right thing, my boss reaffirmed, saying, 
“Ya, it is the right thing.” You know? “You have to look at people. People 
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are not just statistics on a piece of paper. You have to know them through 
and through, inside and out.” So, that gave me a confirmation that what I 
did was right. 
This is a prime example of dialogue that functioned to “maintain.” To put it 
differently, this dialogue helped participant I to be able to “keep together” the 
connection between what he thought to be moral and what he actually did, which 
was not ostensibly in accordance with the rules of the professional world. In the 
following example, the affirmation or reinforcement was similar in character, but 
came from participant F’s close network of friends: 
[Friends] would kind of affirm what I felt. They would say: “Oh my God, 
your mom’s crazy!” You know, like, they would basically be on my side 
in a way. They would say, “If she only knew that we’re normal people.” 
Cause my mom would always say: “Well, whom are you partying with?!... 
Who are you?!... Who are you drinking with?!” 
These friends, in a way, assisted or supported participant F through many key 
turning points in her emerging adult experience. Dialogic experiences such as 
these served to facilitate turning in a manageable way and uphold participants in 
their meaning making endeavors. This was an important communicative moment 
for each of the participants because of the gravity of changes they were going 
through in terms of moral understanding. More than the other categories, the 
“maintaining” function of dialogue points to an orientation, mood, or goal in 
communication that is sensitive to the communicators. The following passage 
from the interview with participant C highlights this difference in disposition 
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(holding together instead of unsettling or inviting newness): 
Maybe that’s part of, you know... the inherent nature of morals, is… you 
can feel if you are butting up against someone else’s morals, so you steer 
conversation in a different direction. Maybe because that’s a value of 
mine, the people I talk to about morality... it isn’t the first conversation we 
have. And in fact, there’s a lot of rapport that’s been built before we 
broach that discussion. And if anybody knows about my moral code, it’s 
because they’ve explicitly asked me... I don’t necessarily share that. 
This reflection came at the very end of the interview and was a prominent theme 
that arose from the culminating influence of participant C’s entire moral turning 
during the whole of emerging adulthood. In this insight, he communicated the 
theme that most fully captured the character of dialogue as maintainer: namely, 
that during the difficult process of moral turning, it is necessary for discussion to 
be as caring and encouraging as possible. This care was found in the affirmation 
and reinforcement that came from close network members. 
Discussion of Results 
 This study brings together insight from several bodies of existing research 
to explore the process of moral turning in a particularly unpredictable period of 
life. Emerging adulthood is a unique stage of development because emerging 
adults face ambiguity or uncertainty in the presence of much transition and 
environmental or social change. The negotiation of morality is a particularly 
interesting and pertinent topic of study in emerging adulthood because many 
individuals between the ages of 18 and 25 years old are still open to various 
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possibilities of moral embodiment. In other words, because moral understanding 
is still being formed and applied in various contexts during emerging adulthood, 
persons have the ability to form moral concepts and put them into practice in 
distinct situations. This study reveals that one of the contexts in which this 
conceptual formation and growth happens is in dialogue about moral issues with 
others. By focusing on turning points in morality, this study was able to give an 
account of how conversations about morality affected change in the moral beliefs 
and behaviors of 10 emerging adults. Through the self-report of memorable 
conversations during the years of 18 to 25, participants gave information that 
helped answer this study’s two research questions: Does dialogue play an 
important role in shaping moral turning points during emerging adulthood? In 
what ways does dialogue influence the character moral turning points during 
emerging adulthood?  
 To summarize, in answer to the first research question, the results indicate 
that dialogue plays a prominent role in moral turning points. Though most of the 
participants in the seven years of emerging adulthood were only able to recount a 
handful of memorable conversations, these conversations lastingly changed their 
concepts of morality. Every participant reported that these dialogic experiences 
still influence the manner in which they relate to others in their adult life. And, in 
answer to the second research question, results indicate that dialogue functions to 
1) offer different interpretations of moral belief or action through “educating” 
dialogue, 2) motivate participants to question existing moral positions through 
“disturbing” dialogue, and 3) prompt emerging adults to participate in an ongoing 
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negotiation and application process through “maintaining” dialogue. In the 
following section, discussion of contributions will address the implications of 
these findings in relation to the various bodies of literature that informed this 
study: literature on moral reasoning and communication, literature on dialogical 
theories of communication, turning points literature, and work explicating 
emerging adulthood. 
Contributions to moral communication literature 
 Instances of moral dialogue reported in this study can be generally 
described as experiences in which emerging adults made sense of the world. 
According to Mariann Martisin (2010), “sense-making is an essential and 
fundamental quality of human being” (p. 109). When participants engaged in 
dialogue with parents, teachers, friends, co-workers, siblings, or romantic 
partners, they were actively engaging in a process of interpreting their experience 
and thereby, “[rendering] their relation to the world and their experience within 
and of the world meaningful” (2010, p. 110). This study’s results complemented 
what others have found to be true about the nature of moral reasoning, namely: 
moral reasoning is a deliberative action, a co-creation, a shared observing of the 
world, a negotiation of competing discourses (Arnett, 2009; Birkhead, 1989; 
Delia, 1977). For all ten participants, conversations had the effect of motivating 
them to be more mindful and aware of their reasons for behaving or believing a 
particular way. Several participants reported that this time was important because 
it provided the opportunity to engage other conceptions of morality firsthand, 
listen to the ways in which others made sense of the world, and reflect on the 
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outcomes of these conceptions.  
 These results indicate that the statement, “moral maturity, defined by the 
capacity for principled reasoning, is actually embodied by very few people” 
(Kohlberg, 1963, as cited in Kurtines & Greif, 1974), fails to perceive the impact 
of dialogue in emerging adults’ capacity to reason morally. Ninety percent of the 
participants communicated a growth in the capacity to explain reasons for others’ 
moral understandings, as well as their own, by engaging in conversation. The data 
point to one explanation for this: the capacity for growth in principled reasoning 
is intimately connected to an increased opportunity for critical dialogue such as at 
college. This particular factor was crucial, as seen in the reported difference of 
dialogue between nine participants who had some level of college education and 
one participant who did not have any college experience. For that participant (G), 
there were fewer instances in which dialogue played a positive role. Instead, 
dialogue about morality was mostly avoided. In fact, participant G related that he 
knew his friends, for instance, “knew they weren’t going to convince [him] of 
anything. One friend… [He] remembered him mentioning, you know: “This is 
wrong.” But, [participant G], [he] didn’t care. His parents often inquired about 
how he was doing or what he was thinking, but he remembered mostly cutting off 
conversation: “I talked less about, like, significant things. It was all just surface.” 
These results reveal that in order for more persons to embody moral maturity in 
their ability to reason, it would be beneficial for them to have opportunities for 
moral dialogue that are abstracted from situations in which their behavior is being 
judged or evaluated. 
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 The Murphy et al. (2009) study, assessing the automaticity of moral 
processing, raised important questions by having participants read stories that 
portrayed behavior that was perceived to be moral or immoral. They found that 
participants had deeply ingrained ideas about “right” and “wrong” and that when 
characters in the stories acted against readers’ moral framework, readers took 
longer to process a target statement at the end, which defined that behavior as 
“good.” The current findings regarding moral turning points suggest a similar 
experiential quality; participants spent a considerable amount of time between 18 
and 25 years old renegotiating what they considered to be moral behavior when 
they were confronted by other conceptions of morality. For example, participant 
D communicated that it took her a long time to really understand love in a deeper 
way when given a definition that had previously eluded her. She had to 
continually revisit the topic in conversations with her partner, friends, family, and 
teachers. Engaging in dialogue seemed to give participants the opportunity to test 
the validity of their automatic moral responses and create a method by which they 
could construct more complex reasons for holding any given moral position.  
 Finally it was learned in the review of literature that Hills (2009) believes 
what separates mere adherence to a particular moral testimony from the ability to 
make mature moral judgments is the ability to start from “true beliefs” and learn 
to make “how” judgments that apply in unique circumstances (p. 105). Insights 
from interviewing these 10 emerging adults corroborate and extend her concerns 
with moral testimony. Accordingly, this process of gaining more knowledge in 
support of more accomplished moral judgments as opposed to relying on the 
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moral testimony of another was exemplified in the experience of most of the 
participants in this study. For example, participants A, E, F, and J in particular 
communicated the positive influence of a college class in helping them to either 
find support for an existing moral understanding or give reasons to show their 
existing moral framework to be found wanting. Often, the “educative” and 
“disturbing” functions of dialogue had the effect of motivating participants to find 
reasonable or propositional supports for their conceptualization of morality.  
Contributions to a dialogical theory of communication 
 On numerous occasions, dialogue served to connect participants with 
people who thought differently, implicitly or explicitly challenging them to make 
sense of moral differences. Furthermore, as a result of turning point conversation 
events, participants were more readily willing to embody important dialogic 
attitudes of communication in their adult relationships. One example of this was 
seen in a common shift from an “I-It” orientation to an “I-Thou” orientation 
among participants (Buber, 1955, as cited in Arnett et al., 2009). This meant that, 
prior to the experiences of emerging adulthood, many participants never 
interacted with persons who thought differently about morality. Participant A’s 
reaction to his philosophy professor is a case in point. He, out of all the 
participants, seemed to have engaged in the highest volume of conversations 
expressly about morality prior to and during emerging adulthood. Yet, his focus 
was largely on arguing or asserting of his existing views. However, when he 
engaged in dialogue with his professor, he was brought out of that manner of 
interaction: 
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This was totally different than anything I’d ever heard. No one had ever 
given me an objective argument before for things… Everything was kind 
of foggy. And, so the moment I was given an objective argument, that 
followed through logically and soundly was when it hit me.  
His professor was the first to provide an articulate challenge to participant A’s 
moral position that causing him to turn from conceptualizing morality from an 
atheistic perspective. At first, his pre-emerging adult fervor persisted, echoing 
another important dialogic theme in the work of Arnett et al. (2009): Demand for 
dialogue moves us from dialogue into monologue and concern for our own image 
of how communication ‘should’ be.” Participant A reported that, by the example 
of his professor and others, he slowly learned to move away from monologue and 
be more attuned: to listen to others and construct a more complete understanding 
of their moral framework before challenging them with his. He came to desire this 
because he realized that “[people] were not so much interested in the argument as 
they [were] in knowing... or, having a relationship with me first.”  
 For parents, educators, or any other teachers of morality, this is an 
important insight. It corroborates ideas put forward by Delia (1977) and other 
communication scholars about the necessity of understanding good 
communication begins with the reality that we share experience. Discovering 
what we share, and how, is an important foundation from which to start: “Not for 
all time, but for a moment, a temporal moment in which difference can meet with 
the project of learning, temporarily bracketing a triad of domination that seeks to 
defame, discount, dissect the Other (Arnett & Arneson, 2001, p. 92). Dialogic 
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theorists’ threefold definition of dialogue, including listening, attending, and 
negotiating new possibilities, aptly marks most of what these emerging adults 
were striving for or moving toward. The experiences that most impacted 
participants created the feeling of “rubato” (as explicated in the review of 
literature). To summarize, moral turning point conversations had the effect of 
slowing the momentum of moral action informed by participants’ existing 
frameworks. This afforded participants “space” to reinterpret, reconceptualize, or 
imagine new possibilities for relating with others, informed by a “larger” 
perspective to which they had been introduced.  
 In addition to validating much of the insight regarding the nature and 
importance of dialogue, this study’s findings support Baxter and Braithwaite’s 
(2008) notion of communication as a dialectic process in which our 
understandings are informed by an admixture of competing discourses. 
Furthermore, participants’ reports of turning point conversations suggest that this 
negotiation is, indeed, diachronic in nature (i.e. meaning making is fluid and 
dynamic as opposed to mechanistic or merely strategic) (Baxter & Braithwaite, 
2008, p. 356). This character of communication and understanding was evident in 
participants’ reports, moving “us away from questions about… the strategic 
deployment of communication to accomplish desired goals. Instead, it moves us 
to a focus on discourse and the joint activities of parties” (p. 357). To be sure, 
turning point conversations were perceived as distinct, definitive shifts in moral 
understanding; however, the exact character or implications of shifts in 
participants’ lives continued to be readjusted through the “maintaining” function 
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of dialogue. For example, participant J communicated: “So, yes. It was more of a 
veering, but I would look at it as... it was a significant change in my life and that’s 
why I considered it a moral turning point.” What she termed “veering” was an 
attempt to explain the effect of experiencing highly influential conversations and 
constantly bringing lessons from such dialogue “alongside” her as she 
experienced college, relationships, or traveling during emerging adulthood. The 
explication of this function of dialogue adds to existing dialectic literature by 
giving a description of one possible way in which persons strive to manage the 
tensions of competing discourses.  
Contributions to turning points literature 
 Participants often described turning points as beginning with a challenge, 
warning, or an invitation. This “disturbance” caused participants to go through a 
period of inquiring, co-reflecting or processing, and redefining their concept of 
morality to take into account the change in circumstance, which brought about the 
questioning. However, dialogue did not always function to directly challenge 
participants’ existing moral framework. In some instances, outlined above, 
participants were merely exposed to or educated about a new framework through 
the sharing of another. Learning about the other’s moral position or framework 
allowed participants to take a new point of view into consideration. Different 
from “disturbing” and “educative” dialogue, “maintaining” dialogue created a 
space for participants to understand connections between new moral conceptions 
and their own moral framework. Thus, moral turning was marked by an increased 
awareness of how beliefs informed participants’ actions and a more explicit form 
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of moral reasoning took shape. As the following passage highlights, the process of 
moral turning for these emerging adults was unique because it forced them to 
reinterpret their experience from alternative points of view: 
I hit that rock bottom, you know. I was like: “My mom taught me this. I 
don’t think it’s true... My dad taught me that. I don’t think it’s true... My 
teacher taught me that. I don’t think it’s true...” You know? “My... my 
priest or the church I went to... I, I don’t think it’s true.  
In this passage, participant I explained to the interviewer that he had to go through 
many turning points that consisted of examining different conceptions of 
morality. It was only through this process of “trying on” these frameworks in his 
emerging adult experience that he was able to come to a place where he felt like 
he knew of what his moral framework consisted.  
 Interestingly, there were many instances of “cross-over” in the functions of 
dialogue. Dialogue worked in such a complex way that at no point was it solely 
“educative,” solely “disturbing,” or solely “maintaining”. Instead, these functions 
informed each other and gave rise to different existential outcomes. For example, 
for some participants, the way in which dialogue functioned to challenge existing 
beliefs was met with negative emotions or reactions. On the other hand, for some 
these challenges were welcomed as invitations to see the world anew. In this way, 
the “disturbing” and “educative” functions of dialogue, in particular, overlapped. 
 Surra & Huston (1987), in their research, defined turning points as 
developmental changes through which relationships “traverse in light of factors 
such as normative ideological shifts, introspection, dyadic examination, and 
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circumstantial change” (p. 90). Dialogic themes of turning substantiate this 
definition with examples from interview data to illustrate each. Without question, 
most participants experienced moral turning points by dyadic examination. 
Participant A engaged in this with girls that he dated, with fellow soldiers in the 
Navy, and with his professor. Participant B engaged in dyadic examination with 
his siblings, girlfriends, parents, and friends. Participant D engaged in this 
practice with her Young Life mentor, her friends, professors, and her romantic 
partner. These few examples reflect the overwhelming presence of opportunities 
to engage others in conversations that collaboratively interpret their relationship 
or experience.  
 Baxter and Pittman’s (2001) functions of communication in turning points 
are applicable in participants’ reported experience of turning as well. For them, 
turning points found there genesis in an intrapersonal manner first, then in dyads, 
followed by processing in a social network, and finally sometimes in a broader 
network. In particular, participants B and E seemed to follow this trajectory. Both 
were involved in conversations that affected their moral framework, though not as 
directly as other participants. Participants B and F described conversations with 
others as secondary to a more introspective process of interpretation and 
reinterpretation of their emerging experience. In fact, the most influential 
component for each of these gentlemen was engaging in dialogue through reading 
influential philosophers or intellectuals. However, it was not always the case that 
communication functioned to motivate change primarily in an intrapersonal or 
cognitive way. The example Baxter and Pittman (2001) give to elucidate 
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intrapersonal turning is a person individually coming to the decision that she has 
found the “perfect mate.” As a result of dialogic function being the focus of 
analysis, these kinds of turning points were often communicated as an 
outworking, or co-creation of conversational experiences. Thus, the intrapersonal 
component was either not present or covered over by the communication of other 
influential processes. The third category, interaction in a social network, was the 
most salient circumstance in which turning points in moral understanding became 
apparent to participants. This was primarily due to the fact that the moral issues 
were social in nature (e.g. church participation, defining and participating in 
marriage, how to spend time with friends).  
 Most fundamentally, this study was organized as an exploration. As a 
result, specific trajectories of turning and characteristics that have garnered 
attention in previous research on turning points (e.g. amplitude or frequency of 
events) were not explicated. However, turning did take on different characteristics 
for each participant for several perceived reasons. To be specific, turning points 
were “sharper” for some participants and, for others; turning was more gradual 
(i.e. a process that happened over the entire course of emerging adulthood). For 
example, participant B reported that his turn away from Christianity was as a 
result of a long process of contemplation and increasing frustration with the way 
in which Christians around talked about morality. Likewise, participant J 
described her turning as a “veering.” Over a process of many years, in many 
conversations, she increasingly became more conservative and resolute in her 
religious views. Her turning points functioned more to distinctly change the way 
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she related with others as she grew in her religious moral framework.  
 This gradual character of turning did not only pertain to the duration of 
turning points. There were also significant differences in the difference in degree 
of turning. In the case of participant J, both the duration and the degree of turning 
were relatively small: she described emerging adulthood as a combination of 
many turning point events that functioned to intensify the conservative nature of 
her moral framework. However, participant B, though the duration of turning was 
extensive, his shift was distinct. He communicated that his life as an adult looks 
starkly different from his childhood because he does not participate in a faith 
community. Another factor that was prominent in the data was the clear 
difference in “maintaining” dialogue as opposed to “disturbing” or “educative” 
dialogue in the way they affected turning. Turning points in previous literature 
have been characterized as a mix of events that bring about and describe change 
and this study’s findings corroborate this notion. When participants described 
particular turning point events (i.e. conversations that had a strong impact on their 
moral understanding) they often described the “disturbing” and “educative” 
functions of dialogue with much greater frequency than “maintaining” dialogue. 
On the contrary, when participants described longer periods of gradual turning, 
the “maintaining” function of dialogue seemed to be more relevant or applicable.  
 Themes that emerged in these participants’ conversations add important 
insight to existing lines of communicative inquiry on turning points. They support 
much of the current knowledge about turning points, but may contribute to a 
deeper understanding of the temporal qualities of turning points. Importantly, 
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turning points showed themselves to be both gradual and sharp, and were 
accompanied by unique forms of dialogue depending on whether experiences 
reflected the former or the later. It is also notable that most turning points research 
focused on a interpersonal communication context, such as family communication 
or relational communication. This study serves as an appeal for turning points 
researchers to think about how turning points theories can function assist our 
understanding of a variety of communicative contexts. 
Contributions to emerging adulthood literature 
 Scholars explicating this period of development keenly communicate the 
characteristics that situate emerging adulthood as conceptually distinct from 
adolescence and adulthood. One of the unique qualities brought out in research 
surrounding emerging adulthood is the increasing longevity of this period. Arnett 
(2000) proposes that this period is “distinguished by relative independence from 
social roles and from normative expectations.” He also adds: “Having left the 
dependency of childhood and adolescence, and having not yet entered the 
enduring responsibilities that are normative in adulthood, emerging adults often 
explore a variety of possible life directions in love, work, and worldviews” 
(Arnett, 2000, p. 469).  
 By interviewing 10 persons about their emerging adult experience it was 
found that these insights are perspicacious in their assessment of this period in the 
life. According to participants, emerging adulthood was filled with opportunities 
to reflect on their childhood, interact with others from different backgrounds, and 
as a result, redefine what they wanted their future to include (i.e. marriage, work, 
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participation in a religious community, opportunities for travel). In particular, 
participants were affected by the concentration of learning and growing that 
happened during this period as opposed to other times in their lives. They were 
“forced” to think more deeply about their moral positions and beliefs, especially 
participants who attended a college or university. This became apparent to 
participant C when he had a conversation with his parents about a particular moral 
issue: 
That’s what struck me about the age range [18-25]... because, when we 
had that conversation, I’m not sure how much my parents had thought 
about that... being or not being apart of their own moral code. Because, 
when I asked them about the statement, they didn’t have a black and white 
answer for that. 
For participant C, engaging in dialogue with others who were in a similar stage of 
life was positive because these conversations introduced him to ways of thinking 
about issues that were not formerly in his purview. This seemed to be the crucial 
aspect of emerging adulthood for the participants in this study. Due to the fact that 
they had not yet “entered the enduring responsibilities that are normative in 
adulthood,” they were able to explore other possibilities through communication 
with others (Arnett, 2000, p. 469).  
 This study contributes to existing literature by way of one particular theme 
that emerged from the data. Existing literature has described this period as a 
period of questioning, experimentation, and growth, ending when persons adopt 
“enduring responsibilities” or when persons “decide” what values they hold. 
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However, the problem is that all of the “value options” put forward in existing 
literature already exist. So, in essence emerging adults are perceived to experience 
a time of relief during which they choose from a number of existential, cultural 
definitions of what it means to be an adults. However, for the participants in this 
study, the process of engaging in dialogue functioned to give them a circumstance 
from which to question these already-existing values, responsibilities or roles. 
This insight stems from results indicating that emerging adults do not just take 
time in their early twenties to choose between already-existing ways of living. 
Through interactions with other conceptions, they make conceptual compromises 
and form new possibilities for being-in-the-world that are new by virtue of their 
being conceived through engaging in dialogue with others. In this way, though 
“the discourses [from which emerging adults’ existing conceptions are informed] 
are distinct, yet they combine to form a new meaning” (Baxter & Braithwaite, p. 
354).  
 This study also contributes to this line of inquiry by discovering one way in 
which cultural differences impact emerging adults’ negotiation of morality. The 
results reveal that, though the content of moral issues discussed by emerging 
adults often varied due to cultural difference (e.g. participant F faced challenges 
from her parents due to a religious understanding rooted in their culture), dialogue 
functioned across cultural contexts in a similar manner. Participant I provided the 
following assessment of the connection between culture and emerging adulthood: 
Once you come out of the closely controlled environment of the family 
system and enter into [emerging adulthood]… it is a very critical time in 
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anyone’s life. It’s probably the only common thing that crosses cultures. 
You know? Like, “18 to 25” is different. Friends grew up, we grew up, we 
came out of the “ecosystem.” Uh, things started looking different to us. 
We started testing our morals that we learned while we were inside, 
outside and probably failed in many instances as I just told you. So, we 
were challenging what we believed in… You know? [Asking:]“Was it 
right?” And just as my friend used to say in Dubai, “the times have 
changed,” we changed with the times. 
Interestingly, participant I understands the experiences in emerging adulthood to 
be cross-cultural. This may be this case because the circumstances characteristic 
in emerging adulthood foster a process so basic to what it means to be human, 
namely: the process of negotiating meaning in a social context to form judgments 
about belief and action. 
Philosophical implications 
 Although the main focus of this study was to explore the function of 
dialogue in very practical way, conducting interviews and analyzing responses, 
the philosophers outlined in the literature review bring something important to 
bear on the results of this study. To put it rather pointedly, moral discourse at 
present seems to lack the quality of critical examination propounded in Plato’s 
work or the public use of one’s reason in Kant’s “enlightened individual.” 
Heidegger (1962) provides a phrase capturing this mindless dialogical milieu: idle 
talk. In the following passage, Heidegger describes the nature of idle talk and its 
effect on our being-in-the-world: 
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Idle talk is something which anyone can rake up; it not only releases one 
from the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated 
kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer… To do 
this, one need not aim to deceive. Idle talk does not have the kind of Being 
which belongs to consciously passing off something as something else. 
The fact that something has been said groundlessly, and then gets passed 
along in further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing 
[Erschliessen] into an act of closing off [Verschliessen]. (1962, p. 213) 
From this passage, we perceive that meaningful dialogue (i.e. as opposed to idle 
talk) is grounded, conscious, authentic, and differentiated. The first of these 
qualities, “grounded,” implies a structural foundation at work when we engage in 
dialogue. Though there are competing discourses informing the way in which we 
interpret our experience, the method by which we organize and examine these 
beliefs provides a stable platform from which we can gauge our conceptual or 
discursive orientations.  
 Every human being uses reason to form concepts, judgments, and 
arguments however unconsciously that formation may seem to be at times. In 
order to form concepts, persons are always-already making use of the laws of 
thought, understanding or calling upon a certain way of gaining knowledge. In the 
discussion of moral turning points, this comes as a pivotal insight for educators, 
parents, and emerging adults alike. Understanding the structure of understanding 
will provide individuals with the knowledge to test various arguments: inferences 
about the nature of experience in general or valuations of particular experiences.  
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 In other words, emerging adults will be able to evaluate “disturbing” or 
“educating” dialogue for meaning or validity. Accordingly, it is important to note 
that meaning-making, dialogue, and persuasion are ongoing, everyday processes 
which call for discernment and discipline in critically analyzing the manner in 
which discourses come together to inform a persons’ belief or action. In his trial 
and death, Plato’s Socrates exemplifies this process of critical examination by 
defending his conduct in teaching the youth of Athens through a lengthy dialogue 
with his accusers. We ought to learn from how Socrates presses his accusers, 
understanding the goal of his pressing, which he deems the perfection and care of 
the soul:  
And if any of you argues to the point and says he does take care, I will not 
at once let him go and depart myself; but I will question and cross-
examine and test him, and if I think he does not possess virtue but only 
says so, I will show that he sets very little value on things most precious, 
and sets more value on meaner things, and I will put him to shame.  
(p. 517) 
Socrates’ cross-examination ought not to be thought of as brazen argumentation. 
Instead, his questions are aimed at discerning whether someone has wisdom or 
merely says they have wisdom and, in fact, does not. This kind of philosophical 
telos is much needed in emerging adults’ dialogue. This would necessarily begin 
with a questioning and awareness of the communicative processes at work in 
one’s family, understanding how one’s family comes to understand.  
 Philosophically, this study holds different insights for educators and 
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parents than it does for emerging adults. This explication of dialogue provides a 
disposition parents and educators may embody with emerging adults experiencing 
moral turning. With a richer understanding of dialogue, parents and educators can 
challenge or invite students to see different moral positions by leaping ahead 
instead of leaping in. Explaining the impact of these different orientations, 
Heidegger (1962) writes: 
[Solicitude] has two extreme possibilities. It can, as it were, take away 
‘care’ from the Other and put itself in his position in concern: it can leap 
in for him. This kind of solicitude takes over for the Other that with which 
he is to concern himself. The Other is thrown out of his position…In 
contrast to this, there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude which 
does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him 
[ihmvorausspringt] in his existentiell potentiality-for-being, not in order to 
take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such 
for the first time. (p. 158) 
This means coming alongside emerging adults and helping them to be better 
interpreters of their experience, not interpreting experience for them. By coming 
alongside and giving emerging adults the depth of understanding by which they 
can realize their potentiality-for-being, persons can make use of the functions of 
dialogue reported in this study in a more sophisticated manner. Instead of 
teaching or trying to persuade persons of a particular behavioral conformity, 
solicitude as leaping ahead can show emerging adults the possibilities of moral 
embodiment in dialogue and not its limits.  
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Practical implications  
 This study offers many practical reasons for gaining a deeper 
understanding of how dialogue functions in turning points during emerging 
adulthood: for emerging adults, adolescents getting ready to enter emerging 
adulthood, parents, teachers, and religious leaders. In general, three dialectic 
principles outlined by Baxter and Braithwaite (2008) may give emerging adults 
concrete methods by which to reflect on dialogic practices in their relationships. 
They suggest that persons should pay attention to: 
1. Discursive history of past utterances in the relationship. 
2. The broader cultural discourse that relationship parties jointly draw on 
as resources in making intelligible utterances in the present. 
3. The anticipated responses from others (including relationship parties 
themselves) in the future. (p. 360) 
If parents or teachers are able to imbue this communicative knowledge into 
adolescents who are entering emerging adulthood, persons will be able to 
participate in dialogue in a more critical or complex manner. In the following 
paragraphs, a few situations where these principles might be applied will be put 
forward. 
 For example, if an emerging adult were overwhelmed by the multiplicity 
of perspectives with which they come into contact, it would be beneficial to 
understand that there are strategies for engaging persons in conversation in order 
to learn more about morality in a more interpersonal, dialogic context such as: 
inquiring of a professor, teacher or mentor for insight, sharing and processing 
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with close friends, or relating experience to parents who are open to listening and 
instructing. Similarly, understanding these functions of dialogue could help 
persons support their friends in moral turning points by giving them examples of 
what it means to use dialogue to affirm the process of deliberation or discussion in 
coming to a deeper understanding of morality. It may even be the case that, if one 
holds a particular view of morality without wrestling with others’ ideas, that a 
deeper understanding of the functions of dialogue may direct this person to 
engage in “educative” or “challenging” dialogue in order to increase their 
awareness of the reasons why they hold to a particular moral framework. To give 
another example, an emerging adult could be at a loss for how to communicate 
with their parents about their moral turning points. Consequently, it might do 
them well to understand how to apply some of the “educative” functions of 
dialogue, particularly the “explaining” or “inviting” functions of dialogue in order 
to engage their parents in dialogue. This need for a deeper understanding of 
dialogue was apparent in interview data as some participants communicated that 
there relationships with their parents were strained as a result of their moral 
turning because their parents didn’t understand their emerging child’s reasons for 
changing their views.  
 In a like manner, this study provides parents with important knowledge 
about how dialogic functions inform the process of moral turning in their adult 
children’s lives. With this perspective, parents may be able engage their adult 
children in conversation by asking them how they are processing through 
challenges to their moral understanding. Also, parents could continue to grow in 
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their educative approach with their children by understanding those moral 
perspectives about which their children are inquiring.  
 Finally, with this understanding, parents may be able to better engage their 
young children in conversations about morality by exposing their children to other 
views, challenging their child’s existing modes of thinking, co-reflecting with 
their children, and inviting their children to ask questions about morality earlier in 
life. In this way, children may be taught more critical, dialogical habits of 
communication and interpretation that may better prepare them for other turning 
points or transitions that come in emerging adulthood.  
Limitations of the Study 
 Over the course of this study it was found that there are limitations to the 
methodological approaches used. Some of the limitations of the study were taken 
into account before research had begun and other weaknesses surfaces as the 
study progressed. First, because convenience sampling was used, as opposed to 
random sampling, the results of this study are necessarily conceptualized as 
qualities represented by the experiences of the 10 participants. However, as 
Koerber and McMichael (2008) pointed to, the components that make “a sample 
convenient often grants the researcher a level of access to and familiarity with the 
sample that guarantees a richness of data that could not be attained if the sample 
were less familiar and therefore less convenient” (p. 463). In other words, the 
results cannot be confidently generalized to a broader population with much 
confidence, but provide a rich description of a unique communicative experience. 
It may be that the dialogic functions elucidated in this research are applicable to a 
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much broader population. However, finding that out would necessitate collection 
of data through alternative sampling methods.   
 Another factor that made data collection difficult was the choice to keep 
the definition of morality broad. It may have been the case that more information 
regarding the specific character of turning points could have been provided had a 
particular moral issue been the focus. However, as this was an exploratory study 
regarding the function of dialogue, it was decided that it would be best if the 
dialogic domain options remained open. Similarly, the next possible weakness 
was mitigated after thought regarding the benefits of a contested sampling 
method. It was decided that the best way to ascertain a fruitful data set would be 
to sample from a network of individuals known to the researcher. This is a 
weakness because it is understood that such knowledge biases results. However, 
as this bias was admitted from the commencement of the interviews, it was 
decided that this form of sampling would none-the-less enable the researcher to 
garner a sample that would be able to provide a wealth of rich experience because 
of the familiarity with the sample set.  
 The final weakness of the study was learned while analyzing the data from 
the interviews. It was realized that when participants were asked questions 
regarding the function of dialogue there was a level of ambiguity. In other words, 
upon analyzing the data, it was found that there were two types of dialogic 
function present: the function that the messenger intended for the dialogue 
(intended function) and the function that dialogue had on the participants’ actual 
turning points in terms of change in belief or behavior (actual function). It would 
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have been beneficial to ask questions of participants that clarified these 
differences. However, this ambiguity transitions into the following section which 
addresses some of the implications for future research based on the present 
findings. 
Implications for Future Research 
 There are numerous questions that arise from these results that can and 
ought to be taken up by future research projects. For example, it was found that 
the engagement in dialogue during moral turning points functioned to raise 
participants’ awareness of why they held particular moral positions and how they 
came to those positions or why they wanted to depart from their existing 
conceptions. However, it could be the aim of future research to see how well 
communicators engage in dialogue surrounding moral issues during emerging 
adulthood. It could be asked: Are emerging adults cognitively complex in the way 
they use dialogue to challenge other moral frameworks? Do emerging adults grow 
in their ability to effectively and appropriately inquire about other moral 
positions?    
 Another interesting aspect for possible research would be to discover if a 
correlation could be made between the intended function of dialogue surrounding 
moral turning and the actual function in terms of turning point trajectory. In other 
words, future research could potentially find that “challenging” dialogue is 
positively correlated with a distinct turn away from one’s existing morality to an 
diametrically opposing system of morality. Or it could be found that with greater 
level of reinforcement, redefining, and affirming dialogue on the part of family 
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members or existing friend networks leads emerging adults to hold on to more 
aspects of their existing moral beliefs or behaviors than if these dialogic behaviors 
are not present.  
 There are many opportunities to explore communication practices 
surrounding the topic of morality and many salient contexts in which to study 
morality. This line of inquiry is important because, if it is thoroughly addressed, 
we can learn to live well together in the communities in which we find ourselves. 
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